The Sufi teaching story and contemporary approaches to composition by Burgess, Linda Kathryn
California State University, San Bernardino 
CSUSB ScholarWorks 
Theses Digitization Project John M. Pfau Library 
1999 
The Sufi teaching story and contemporary approaches to 
composition 
Linda Kathryn Burgess 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project 
 Part of the Rhetoric and Composition Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Burgess, Linda Kathryn, "The Sufi teaching story and contemporary approaches to composition" (1999). 
Theses Digitization Project. 1533. 
https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project/1533 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the John M. Pfau Library at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Theses Digitization Project by an authorized administrator of CSUSB ScholarWorks. 
For more information, please contact scholarworks@csusb.edu. 
  
THE SUFI TEACHING STORY
 
AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO COMPOSITION
 
A,:■Thes'is;-^-- ,; 
; Presented to the 
; Ractllty.' of ' ; ; 
California Statd Universitiy, 
Sa:n Bernardino 
In Partial Fulfi1Iment
 
of the Requirement for the Degree
 
Master of Arts
 
rn 
English Composition 
Linda Kathryn Burgess 
March 1999 ' : 
THE SUFI TEACHING STORY
AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO COMPOSITION
.A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino
by
Linda Kathryn Burgess
March 1999
Approved by:
Ri^eAxelrod^ Chair, English Date
Carol Haviland
Salaam Yousif
 ABSTRACT
 
T thesis examines Sufi teaching stories with an eye
 
to their possible contribution to composition theory and
 
practice. The Sufi stories, developed in the "medieval"
 
Middle East, are the texts of a problem-posing pedagogy
 
very similar to the pedagogy of knowing developed in the
 
West in the 1960s by Paulo Freire. Like critical literacy
 
teachers, Sufis problematize the nature of signification,
 
question the existence of a coherent experiencing subject,
 
and examine the effects of cultural conditioning. However,
 
like other composition teachers who are unwilling to give
 
up the idea of authentic voice, Sufis also value the wisdom
 
and creativity of the individual. They do not recognize the
 
binary thinking that divides composition into critical and
 
expressivist schools.
 
Some contemporary theorists insist on the necessity of
 
abandoning claims of foundational truth. Sufis, however,
 
believe that an invisible order underlies diverse
 
manifested forms. I argue that their Neoplatonic worldview,
 
congruent with a postmodern paradigm shift, might bridge
 
the divisions in composition.
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CHAPTER ONE: What Befell the Three
 
Sufi teaching stories, a medium of instruction in the
 
Middle East for more than a millenium, began to gain a
 
popular following in the West in 1964, when the Naqshbandi
 
Sufi leader Idries Shah of Afghanistan published the first
 
of his many English-language books about the stories
 
(Sufis). At that time, the idea of waking people up from
 
automatically believing what they read, hear or see was
 
unfamiliar and surprising to most Westerners. The idea that
 
a text comes into existence with different meaning for each
 
reader had not yet gained wide acceptance in Western
 
literary criticism as it would with the popularization of
 
Reader Response criticism in the seventies. We were also
 
largely unprepared to expect a narrative to serve an
 
instructional purpose. In 1967, Shah wrote that the true
 
function of the Sufi stories is so foreign "to the modern
 
world that no technical or popular term exists to describe
 
them" (Caravan 223). In 1978 he added.
 
We have had to re-open the question of the
 
possible value of tales, stories, jokes and
 
narrative, and hold this door open in the face of
 
a long-standing Western convention that such
 
material is only of entertainment value. What has
 
happened is that the equivalent of a
 
technological infra-structure, or a basic
 
literacy in this field, is being established in
 
the West. (Learning 101)
 
There is no doubt that Shah faced a Western world
 
unprepared to understand him. His timing, however, was
 
perfect, as the dawning of the postmodern period in Western
 
thought created an opening for the appearance of Sufi
 
teaching. Composition theorist Lester Faigley characterizes
 
Western aesthetics, politics, science and pop culture of
 
this period as growing in an "awareness of randomness,
 
ambiguity and chaos" (3). Both Faigley and James Berlin
 
{Rhetorics) describe the influence of deconstructive
 
postmodern philosophers and the economic and cultural
 
conditions of the population in the seventies and eighties
 
on the teaching of composition. Theorists in the physical
 
sciences, the social sciences, and composition were talking
 
about a "paradigm shift," a new worldview that foregrounds
 
process and relationship rather than analysis of separate
 
parts.
 
At the same time, although Faigley and Berlin don't
 
mention it, record numbers of people were turning to the
 
security of organized religion or to the alternative
 
consciousness offered by metaphysics, parapsychology, or
 
hallucinogenic drugs. We experienced the Age of Aquarius
 
and the Harmonic Convergence. Sufi mystics, long-time
 
believers iri the ancient Greek concept of kairos, arrived
 
from the East at just this auspicious moment, bringing
 
ancient techniques for tearing down positivist illusions
 
and for facilitating spiritual revelation. "When the
 
student is ready, the teacher will appear," they said.
 
During this Same time period that Sufis were
 
introducing their new "literacY" to popular audiences in
 
the west, cpmppsitibn theorists were working on a parallel
 
track to create a pedagogy for "critical literacy," a new
 
set of criteria for reading and writing, influenced by
 
postmodern philosophers who question positivist views of
 
language and reality. Although teachers of composition have
 
remained largely unaware of the material from the Middle
 
East, the work that we have been doing in our classrooms in
 
recent years closely resembles the Sufi teachings.
 
We can see an example of the parallels by looking at
 
the classic Middle Eastern story of "What Befell the
 
Three," which tells the adventures of three dervishes
 
(ascetic holy men) who were searching for the Deep Truth in
 
ways that resemble our own search for ways to teach
 
composition. "The first, Yak-Baba, sat down and
 
contemplated until his head was sore" the story says. "The
 
second^: Do-^gha^ & his head until his feet were
 
sore. The third, Se-Kalendar, read books until his nose
 
bled." Each of the dervishes found that his efforts were
 
not successful, so the three got together to perform their
 
rituals in unison in search of a Way (Shah, Tales 103).
 
This allegory sounds a bit like the story of composition
 
theory starting about thirty years ago when we abandoned
 
our "storehouse" and "garret" images of how writing should
 
be taught. We stopped expecting our students to write
 
solely as a result of having read or having concentrated,
 
or having been visited by the muse, and began to look at
 
reading and writing as social processes.
 
In the Sufi story, the three teachers saw a weird
 
apparition in the shape of a head. While they were arguing
 
about which mythological creature it might be, it roared at
 
them, "Have you never heard the saying that there are 'as
 
many Ways as there are hearts of men'?" The strange head
 
(possibly, in our terms, a cognitive theorist) sent each of
 
the dervishes off in a different direction.
 
Curiously, the countries where they were sent seem to
 
bear some resemblance to some of the locations on the map
 
of contemporary composition sketched out by James Berlin in
 
his College English article, "Contemporary Composition: The
 
Major Pedagogical Theories" (233-247). Yak-Baba went to the
 
"Country of Fools," where he found people cowering in fear
 
of a watermelon. In an act somewhat akin to the work Berlin
 
identifies as Current-Traditional composition, Yak-Baba
 
drew out his knife and cut the melon open. He showed the
 
people how the melon was constructed and how it could be
 
used. He even ate a piece of it. But the people were so
 
certain that watermelons were dangerous that they refused
 
to follow his example. "We don't want to know anything
 
about it," they said.
 
This piece of the allegory could be seen as a
 
description of the kind of teaching of writing that takes
 
text apart and exposes its structure, applying to student
 
writing the set of surgical skills we have developed in
 
analyzing literature. The story could even be said to
 
depict a teacher attempting to model the identity of a
 
writer.
 
The second dervish, Do-Agha, was sent on a guest to
 
"find the Magic Mirror." When he found it, it was very
 
small and incomplete, being the reflection of the limited
 
thoughts of mankind. But, gazing into it, upside down, he
 
found Deep Knowledge, and he spent many happy years
 
teaching. His students, however, could not maintain the
 
Goncentration.-necessary to learn anything by looking into :
 
mirrors. They'saw only the images of their own faces.
 
Bo-Agha's experience seems to be analogous to the part
 
of composition country Berlin calls Platonic, where
 
students are engaged in an "internal apprehension" and ;
 
searching for their "authentic voices"(239). The image of
 
the mirror itself might be a reference to Plato's image in
 
Phaedrus (255D). This Platonic mirror turns up often in
 
Sufi stories (Shah, Learning 289, Schimmel, VJind 74-75,
 
101-102, 145).
 
The dervish who liked to read, Se-Kalendar, was
 
instructed to seek the aid of the Jinn of the Whirlpool, a
 
difficult task akin to the work of Berlin's New
 
Rhetoricians. He traveled far, observing many different
 
cultures, asking questions. Every time he got close to the
 
Jinn, it turned out that he had just missed it because it
 
was called by another name in that locality. He seemed to
 
be trapped in what we might call a postmodern impasse,
 
foregrounding differences, unable to reach any solid
 
ground. Eventually he met the Jinn and learned a pattern of
 
activities that led him to great understanding. But his
 
students, copying his motions without realizing the journey
 
that led to them, did not achieve wisdom.
 
Each of these teachers was the founder of a school,
 
inspiring students to slay watermelons, gaze into mirrors,
 
or perform strange rituals for'centuries after the original
 
meaning of the actions had been forgotten.
 
This tale is attributed to Murad Shami, who died in
 
1719. Shah says that the story conceals a deeper meaning
 
than the obvious (Tales 103), but he, being a typical Sufi*
 
teacher,' does not tell what it is. Neither Shah nor Shami,
 
of course, could have imagined the interpretation I have
 
stretched this story to provide. They had never heard of
 
multiple intelligences, modes or genres of discourse,
 
expressivism or social-constructionism. Shami was
 
describing some of the Ways of teaching that developed
 
during the classical Sufi' period in the Middle East, from
 
700 to 1500 AD (Shah, Sufis- 27) and their later
 
crystallization into traditions. He was pointing, I
 
believe, to individual differences that mask an underlying
 
similarity among students and teachers everywhere: the way
 
that they are blinded by their preconceived ideas and the
 
way they copy the outer forms rather than the central
 
tenets of a teaching. For me, the moral of this story is
 
that rigid attention to theoretical consistency interferes,
 
with teaching and learning.
 
In Shami's time, the story was pertinent because
 
teaching in the Middle East was experiencing a period of
 
stagnation(Shah, Learning 101). However, during the
 
classical period of Sufi thought, from the eighth century
 
to the fourteenth, this part of the world had been a
 
turbulent center for epistemological debate. Inquiry into
 
ways of knowing and teaching had flourished. Steady
 
migration throughout the Islamic realm as well as the
 
pressures brought by the European Christian Crusaders and
 
the savage Mongol armies of Genghis Khan kept diverse
 
cultures in contact and in turmoil (Harvey 19). New ways of
 
thinking challenged an authoritative teaching model based
 
on the legalistic, formal traditions of Islam. Iconoclastic
 
and counter-hegemonic Sufi teachers created the stories to
 
keep students awake and thinking about the conditioning
 
that defined their ways of processing data.
 
Most composition teachers today have traveled an
 
imaginary landscape similar to that of the story, trying
 
one Way or another, and synthesizing elements of several
 
into our individual teaching programs, as we have attempted
 
to help students from a wide variety of cultural
 
backgrounds see in multiple ways. Our expanding view of
 
what it can mean to teach composition is evident right now
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 in the CSUSB Englisli Department, where the faculty has 
agreed to new (1998) Guidelines for English 101. The new 
catalog description calls for "Emphasis on the processes of 
writing and critical reading, not only to communicate, but 
also to generate thinking and to examine assumptions." 
These new goals, with their "not only to" and "but also 
to," articulate our commitment to provide a variety of 
Ways. ■ : ■ .' ■ 
Our new choices, examining assumptions and generating 
thought, suggest that we want to include aspects of two 
forms of non-positivist composition theory that Berlin 
describes as New Rhetoric and Platonism. Sufi mystics use 
elements of both. Like the composition theorists Berlin 
classifies as New Rhetoricians (242-3), the Sufis use texts 
as a basis for their teaching but not for the purpose of -■ 
transmi11ing information. They see texts as dynamic 
catalysts to thought. Like contemporary critical literacy 
theorists, they problematize the nature of signification 
and question the existence of a stable, coherent subject. 
But for the New Rhetorician, Berlin says, there is no truth 
outside of that created in the social exchange (243) . 
For the Sufi, on the other hand, truth resides beyond 
the realm of language. Exercises in examining assumptions 
; '■ ■ ■ I' , 1 V; .g- : . ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ i: . 'V ■' ■ 
remove the obstacles to experiencing reality. These
 
beTiefS/ along with a concept of "remembrance" of a
 
perfect Being behind all forms, and an emphasis on the use
 
of analogy, position parts of their pedagogy in the
 
Platonic category of Berlin's model (241).
 
Berlin paints the New Rhetoric and Platonic positions 
in composition theory as mutually exclusive reactions 
against the positivist Current-Traditional model, since 
each emphasizes a■different view of truth and of writers. 
But in fact many composition teachers use a combination of 
methods reflecting a variety of theoretical backgrounds. 
Perhaps the contemporary sense of separation between the 
threads of composition pedagogy might be bridged by an 
epistemology like the Sufi one. A Sufi believes that the 
student is both a product of cultural conditioning and an 
individual with innate abilities. Sufis use the 
deconstruction of binaries as a transition to respect for 
the underlying unity of human experience. 
Since Shah brought Sufi stories to the West in the 
sixties, the stories have turned up in academic work in 
various ways. Stanford psychologist Robert Ornstein 
incorporated many of them into a revision of his Psychology 
of Consciousness, suggesting that they might help connect 
the linear and non-linear functions of the brain (141). The
 
CSUSB History Department is demonstrating its current
 
interest in "medieval" Islam by planning a conference on
 
Rumi for October, 2000. But the stories have made their way
 
into ;the literary canon of the university only in the realm
 
of comparative literature, where reviewers such as John
 
Chen have drawn comparisons between the overt meaning of
 
the stories and Chinese, Taoist and Shakespearean themes.
 
References to the stories in the literature of "English"
 
studies are limited to their use by Nancy Shields Hardin
 
and a few other critics in their analyses of the work of
 
contemporary British novelist Doris Lessing.
 
I think that the stories have been inaccessible to us
 
as composition theorists because there is such a
 
fundamental difference between scholars and Sufis. As
 
scholars in the West, we have been interested in inductive
 
reasoning, in accumulating information and making
 
generalizations from it, in comparing it with what we
 
already know. Shah tells us that Sufis, on the other hand,
 
are dedicated to "developing a line of communication with
 
ultimate knowledge, not with combining individual facts,
 
however historically exciting, [n]or [with] theorizing in
 
any way at all" {Sufis, xi). Ultimate knowledge has not
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been included in our paradigm of academic pursuits since
 
before the Enlightenment, and it is still not a popular
 
idea now that many in composition are engaged in the
 
postmodern activity of scoffing at metanarratives.
 
However, it is in this capacity as a "line of;
 
communication," as a mystical teaching, that thousands of
 
these teaching stories are in print in English now and
 
drawing a large popular following. Kabir Helmihski, one of
 
the twentieth century translators of the great Sufi
 
storyteller Jelaluddin Rumi, estimates from the sales of
 
his books that Rumi may have been the best-selling poet in
 
America for the last ten or fifteen years (Alborz 3).
 
By eschewing theory and by embracing a variety of
 
visions of the individual, the Sufi pedagogy allows
 
alternative worldviews to coexist. It is flexible enough to
 
be useful in a wide variety of situations. Although its
 
vision of an "ultimate knowledge" will offend those who
 
demand the abandonment of metanarratives, its appeal seems
 
to be wide. The Sufi view that education should develop the
 
latent ability of the individual to perceive and to process
 
information (Einhorn 4) is entirely consistent with the
 
emphasis on psychological strategies and experiential
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education that characterizesimuch of contemporary
 
composition practice.
 
Therefore, I believe it may be rewarding to look at
 
the Sufi teaching story in terms of how it might be used in
 
teaching ways of reading and writing. Although we do not
 
know what kind of writing assignments Sufis give (if any)
 
or how they assess student progress, the Sufi preparatory
 
work for beginning students, the work that is done with
 
these stories,- is fascinatingly similar to many of the
 
projects of the contemporary first-year composition
 
classroom.
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CHAPTER TWO: The Dervish and the Grammarian
 
The Sufi teaching story is a hard item to define. At
 
first glance, it appears to be a very short story
 
resembling a joke. But Sufi stories may well occupy a genre
 
niche of their own, differentiated from similar stories by
 
their function. A few Sufi stories take the form of
 
adventure sagas, like the one in my introduction, but most
 
are very brief narratives, often less than fifty words, .
 
lacking in any descriptive detail, that provide a snappy
 
bit of conversational repartee. Consider this typical
 
example, attributed to the great thirteenth century
 
storyteller Jelaluddin Rumi:
 
A grammar teacher fell in the well and was
 
screaming for help. A dervish came along. He
 
said, "I'll get you out. I seen a ladder up at
 
the mosque."
 
The grammarian said, "Young man, your verb
 
tense is incorrect."
 
The dervish said, "If that's what you think
 
is important in this situation, you'd better stay
 
in the well until I learn to speak correctly,"
 
and he went on down the road, (retold from Shah,
 
Tales 193)
 
As this story illustrates, a Sufi story may present a
 
dialog between two people, one with a traditional point of
 
view and one who questions it, or it may depict a person or
 
a group of people whose thought processes are ordinary but
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mistaken. Often metaphor, or analogy is
 
involved. The dialog is highly indirect, like many jokes
 
that require the hearers to fill in missing premises before
 
they laugh. However, the stories are not intended as jokes.
 
The stories of this genre seem to be something like
 
the tales and fables of many folk traditions, but their
 
purpose is different. As literary critic Nancy Shields
 
Hardin points out, most folk tales provide entertainment
 
and a moral of some sort (314), The Sufi story is not
 
intended for either purpose. Often it strikes the hearers
 
as funny, but its main purpose is to change their thinking
 
processes — and to do it by another means than supplying a
 
model for the expected outcome. The Sufi story is always a
 
means, not ah end, a teaching tool intended to upset rather
 
than inform. Shah says that the Sufi story works to expose
 
assumptions that are an unconscious part of the student's
 
ways of thinking {Learning 38). The story remains open-

ended, depending on the response of a hearer or reader for
 
interpretation (Hardin 314). Beyond that, the experience of
 
interpreting a Sufi story is said to help the student to
 
develop new connections within the brain, enabling more
 
intuitive perceptions (Einhorn 2-3).
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Our story about the teacher in the well is an exemplar
 
I have chosen for its relevance to our work in composition.
 
The obvious meaning to a composition teacher at CSUSB this
 
year will likely be that correct form is not always the
 
highest priority. But the story may also illustrate the
 
principle that it is the people in positions of power who
 
make the rules, or that people who are at the bottom may
 
have difficulty analyzing the conditions of their
 
oppression. My students have added that the story has
 
these meanings:.
 
• "Don't look a gift holy man in the mouth."
 
• "In a life or death situation, be glad if there's
 
somebody around who speaks your language at all."
 
• "Be careful how you criticize."
 
• "There's a time and a place for everything."
 
• "The tree that can bend will survive."
 
A,Sufi teacher would applaud all of these interpretations
 
as correct (although preliminary). Sufi stories do not
 
necessarily have a hidden meaning or a "real" meaning; they
 
are designed solely to be decoded to show that they have
 
multiple meanings (Shah, !Vay 27-28). It is the assumption
 
that the story has a different meaning for each individual
 
16
 
that makes a Sufi teaching story something more than a joke
 
or a fable. It is an assumption that might also make such a
 
story a pleasant and nonthreatening introduction to
 
literary analysis in the composition classroom. In the
 
process of discovering many meanings in a simple story,
 
students may develop confidence that their individual views
 
are valid.
 
A Sufi interpretation of the story involves taking it
 
a step beyond generalities, taking it to a personal level
 
(Einhorn 3). I have experienced Sufi group lessons where
 
the teacher presented a story and then divided the class
 
into small groups of two or three to work with a prompt
 
that related the story to personal experience. For this
 
story, there might be a sequence of prompts: "Have you'ever
 
refused to accept help because you objected to the way
 
someone spoke?" and "Can you think of a situation where you
 
refused to help someone who seemed to be judging you?" In
 
a Sufi gathering, each student would have perhaps five
 
minutes to talk through a think-aloud protocol, with the
 
other group members listening as silent witnesses. In a
 
composition classroom we could accomplish much the same
 
exploration of memory in a slightly less invasive way by
 
assigning these prompts as freewrites, to be shared or not
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as the writer chooses. I believe that the Sufi speaking
 
session, where the student speaks without stopping for set
 
period of time in response to a closely-defined prompt is
 
very closely related to the freewriting exercises we
 
propose in our classrooms. ..
 
A Sxifi teacher would close this lesson by bringing the
 
class back together to share their insights, possibly
 
directing the conversation toward a comparison of the two
 
experiences.' Is the dervish on moral high ground here, or
 
has pride become a problem for both parties? A composition
 
teacher might raise the same questions, possibly in
 
preparation for effective collabbration in peer review. Or
 
we might take the question in a more global direction,
 
asking the class to consider whether Standard English is
 
appropriate in all communicatioh Situations.
 
Although the ultimate purpose of Sufi teaching is to
 
bring students to a sense of their spiritual unity, the
 
texts Sufis use with beginning students, these teaching
 
stories, have no obvious referehce to religion or to
 
spirituality. They are intended to change the way the;
 
student processes everyday perceptiohs, opening a door to
 
interrogation of assumptions and motives. Thus they are
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designed to address one of the objectives of many of the
 
composition courses taught today.
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CHAPTER THREE:. Following the Scent of Roses:
 
. Sfories. used by Sufi teachers, today are. ofteh ancient1
 
stories adapted to the contemporary scene, retrofitted with
 
billboards, hospitals, streetlights, keys, and restaurants,
 
in keeping with the Sufi, theoretical positibn that a story
 
has no integrity as an object but should change to fit the
 
local situation. This position also explains why most of
 
the stories are not attributed to any particular author or
 
time. Consequently it is difficult to work from the stories
 
themselves to build the framework that Western scholarly
 
tradition conditions us to expect in dealing with a
 
literary genre or a pedagogical theory: tracing its
 
development and florescence.
 
But from the beginning of the period in which Sufis
 
have been identified as a group, close to the time of the
 
Prophet Muhammad (A.D.5707-632) (Shah, Sufis 27), they have
 
had a reputation for expressing themselves with shrewd,
 
pithy questions that upset more traditional thinkers. They
 
have distinguished themselves by abandoning both the values
 
of the world and the formalism of Islamic law, by claiming
 
a relationship with God based on love and direct
 
revelation, and by using shocking figures of speech to get
 
their point across.
 
The culture in which Sufis ;devel6ped::,this,p
 
:ifocused on religious helief,"to a degree tliat we can
 
scarcely imagine. When, for example^ a Sufi; says
 
"Hamdulilla,'i:we; translate the words literally ais ;
 
"Praise the Lord," and be referring to some distant deity
 
that we would never mention in the classroom. But the Sufi
 
means "Praise God in all his manifestations—and;,eyerything
 
is a manifes;tation;Qf God. The . challenge for a:Sufi;,is to •
 
figure out how God. is .represented .in everything that
 
tfanspires. Gonsequent.ly, any human action becomes a ;
 
metaphor for God's action. The Sufi, looking at a chaotic
 
world and trying to see God's hand, is a master generator
 
of metaphors (Barks in;Rumi,, Delicious x). And when a Sufi
 
deconstructs a binary like sacred and profane or good and
 
evil, the resulting answer is that it is all God. It is
 
nearly impossible for Westerners to grasp the mental habits
 
that produce this worldview.
 
But it is possible to get some sense of the
 
development of the Sufi teaching materials by looking at a .
 
few of the practitioners. I've chosen to touch down in four
 
places in classical Sufi history: with Rabia al Adawiyya
 
(7177-801?), Muhammad Al-Ghazzali (1058-1111), Jelaluddin
 
Rumi(1207-73), and Mulla Nasrudin (possibly c.1237-84). ;
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Rabia.
 
Rabia,. born early in the.- century iri Basra, is
 
often.cited as a pivotal person in the development of Sufi
 
thought. Legend has accorded her full stature with men in
 
knowledge and saintliness, but, unlike men, she is not
 
referred to by her surname. Throughout the literature she
 
is called simply "Rabia"(Smith 2) She lived a life of
 
extreme poverty, orphaned and sold into slavery as a child,
 
in a culture where property, education, and literacy were
 
reserved for upper-class males. When her master freed her,
 
she refused offers of marriage, continuing to live a meager
 
existence voluntarily, taking a vow to ask no one for
 
anything but to accept only what God gave her. Her extreme
 
devotion to God allowed her to ignore her suffering
 
completely (Smith 29-52, El Sakkakini 17-30).
 
While Rabia did not write or tell full-blown multi
 
character narratives herself, her incisive correctives made
 
her a character in later teaching stories. Stories are told
 
about the intellectuals of Basra coming to learn from her
 
and about her responses to them. It is told that she heard
 
the venerated teacher Salih al-Marri preaching on the theme
 
carried over from Christianity to Islam: "Knock and the '
 
door will be opened to you."
 
Rabia asked him, "When has,that door ever been
 
closed?" (El Sakkakini 66, Shah, Learning. 75),
 
demonstrating the sense of access to God that is
 
characteristic of Sufi teaching. But Rabia didh't say, "My
 
point of view is a little more holy She asked her student
 
a question that caused him to think about what he was
 
saying.
 
Today's collectors of Sufi stories ascribe to Rabia a
 
cleverness that foreshadows the full development of the
 
Sufi story genre. British novelist Doris LeSsing, for
 
example, says that accounts of Rabia's teaching reveal "a
 
dry wit, an originality, something salty and simple" (El
 
Sakkakini 5). Lessing recounts as evidence the onion
 
incident: A woman was cooking stew outside Rabia's house
 
and needed an onioh. A bird flew over and dropped one into
 
the pot.^VA^ Lessihg retells^^^ t^ story, "The other woman
 
said it was a rairacle from God. Rabia said, -My Lord is not
 
an onion merchant'"(6). Lessing's account of the story is
 
close to that given by her Sufi teacher, Idries Shah,
 
except that Shah puts Rabia's response in the form of a
 
question: "'A miracle, you,say? What, does my Lord
 
therefore keep an onion shop?'" {Learning 55).
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It's a good story, but it is probably not historically
 
accurate. The careful research of scholar Margaret Smith
 
into accounts written soon after Rabia's death turns up a
 
less interesting version: "Rabia was boiling some food in a
 
cooking pot and needed an onion, but had none, and there
 
appeared a bird with a wild onion in its beak and threw it
 
down to her" (Abd Allah b. Isa, qtd. by Smith 56). That was
 
the end of the story at the time. According to Smith, the
 
Persian poet Farid al-Din Attar (cll20-cl230) added to the
 
story the plot development that Rabia refused to eat the
 
onion, saying "'I am not safe from a trick' (i.e. perhaps
 
Satan had sent the onion)" (55). This version of the story
 
adds a dualism, a binary between God and Satan, that is
 
uncommon in Sufi thought. Rabia's clever retort
 
distinguishing Allah from an onion dealer seems to be a
 
still later addition to the story and one that departs
 
still farther from the usually pantheistic bent of Sufi
 
stories.
 
I reveal the variations among these accounts to
 
qualify any impression I may be giving that I can draw a
 
straight timeline of Sufi thought. There is great
 
difficulty in working with texts that are so extremely old
 
and that have been retranslated and retransmitted by people
 
with a variety of political agendas. Additional difficulty
 
arises for the English-language reader because Arabic and
 
Persian words resonate depths of meaning in a way that
 
English can never convey. We cannot know for sure what
 
Rabia said or what it meant to her hearers.
 
Despite these difficulties, authorities East and West
 
agree that Rabia was one of the originators of a new way of
 
thinking that turned popular perceptions around, stressing
 
the personal spiritual life rather than the formal require­
rnents of Islamic orthodoxy, and distinguishing divine love
 
from human emotionality (Smith 232, El Sakkakini 70). In a
 
world where Islamic authorities proclaimed the glory of God
 
with lengthy retellings of the traditions of the trans
 
mission of revelation, in proper historic sequence, with
 
magnificent artwork and calligraphy, a humble, illiterate
 
woman who owned nothing and who preferred prayer to food
 
became a prototype for a new kind of teacher.
 
Sufi ideas gained a considerable popular following in
 
the next centuries. Dervish orders began to flourish. These
 
schools were small working communities where disciples
 
gathered around a teacher (Schimmel, Wind 24). One of
 
Shah's collections of Sufi stories. Tales of the Dervishes,
 
25
 
unusual.in, that it gives references to authors of stories,
 
traces many stories to this time period.
 
A great center of world knowledge developed in
 
Baghdad in the eighth century, as the prestige of Greek
 
science was growing there (von Grunebaum 54). islamic
 
scholars studied Greek philosophy, astronomy and natural
 
science, building a scientific tradition on the work of
 
Ptolemy and Galen. In the tenth and eleventh centuries,
 
Arab poets were elaborating on the Platonic theme of love
 
as a divine madness (von Grunebaum 323). However, the
 
theologians and philosophers of Islam did not read Homer or
 
Greek mythology, because their sensibilities were informed
 
by a belief in a single God. Many Muslims were critical of
 
Plato as well because of the pantheon of gods that cavort
 
in his work. Some were suspicious of all that talk about
 
love. One sect, the Zahirites, basing religious law on
 
literal readings of the Koran, argued that people who feel
 
something they think is love toward God are merely
 
projecting a fantasy, for God is altogether incommensurable
 
with human beings (Al-Ghazzali 58-59).
 
During this time, Sufi saints upset orthodox Muslims
 
by claiming direct revelation and, in some cases, direct
 
union with God, without the help of transmitted revelation,
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authorities, or rationality. The controversial mystic Al-

Hallaj was executed for such a blasphemy in 922, for
 
saying, "I am the Truth." His execution did not serve as a
 
deterrent to Sufis, however, but stirred up sympathy and
 
more rebellion (Daniel xxxi).
 
The earliest extant text that attempts to reconcile
 
Sufi thought and orthodoxy was written about this time by
 
Abu Bakr al-Kalabadhi, a lawyer who died in Bokhara about
 
990 (Schimmel, Mystical 85), cataloguing the tenets of
 
Islam as accepted by Sufis and the technical terms used by
 
them. Kalabadhi sought unity above all, attempting to
 
deconstruct the binaries that led to discrimination against
 
Sufis (Kalabadhi 125-6).
 
But the Islamic community continued to splinter into
 
numerous sects, each with its own concerns. The powerful
 
Shiites, particularly the exclusive Ismaili movement,
 
taught that followers must be guided by authoritative
 
teachers into the esoteric secrets of the religion, while
 
the mainstream Sunnis believed that the Prophet Muhammed
 
had given all the instruction anybody needs (Daniel xxix;
 
Schimmel, Mystical 93-95).
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Ghazzall
 
At the close of the eleventh century, the great
 
scholar and pedagogical theorist Abu Hamid Muhammad Al-

Ghazzali, a professor of Islamic theology of the Nizamia
 
school at.Baghdad, looked at this complex situation from
 
the point of view of bolstering the Sunni position. He
 
recbgriized that the various forms of orthodox Islam held in
 
common a view of their religion as doctrine explicated by
 
an intellectual elite and followed by the passive masses.
 
He recognized, too; that the anti-intellectual popular
 
uprising known as Sufism could serve his purpose of uniting
 
the people against the Shiites if he could reconcile it
 
with the orthodoxy of the Koran (Daniel xxx).
 
Ghazzali set out to create a pedagogy that would take
 
the immediate experience and the purified lifestyle of the
 
mystic, the pathos and ethos of the Sufi position, and set
 
them in an intellectual framework (Daniel xxxiii). This
 
work represented a major mind-shift for the great scholar,
 
who was known for having memorized more than 300,000 verses
 
of the Koran in a lifetime of supporting its authority. Now
 
he turned heads in Islam by announcing that real education
 
consists not of filling students with information, but of
 
Stimulating their consciousness (Shah, Sufis 150). His
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solution seems to foreshadow the twentieth-century work of
 
Paulo Freire, who decries a "banking" model of education
 
and asks students to become aware of-their thinking (Freire
 
58), in the interest of empowering the common person.
 
Ghazzali sought to purge Sufism of its Neoplatonic and
 
ecstatic elements (Schimmel, Mystical 96). But he used the
 
techniques developed by Sufi teachers, those short stories
 
that point out the fallacies of common ways of thinking, to
 
build his case for the value of examining assumptions. In
 
his Alchemy of Happiness, for example, he presents the
 
story of a group of blind men feeling an elephant, to show
 
that the data gained by observation of the world of
 
phenomena are disputable (Al-Ghazzali 20). I'll return to
 
this story in the next chapter to show how it relates to
 
our current practice in asking students to read critically.
 
Ghazzali's teaching spread to other Sufi schools and
 
brought a Sufi influence to moderate Islam. Sufi curriculum
 
included reading and writing, but it did not necessarily
 
prepare students for positions of power or for employment.
 
Sufis were teaching students to question authority, to
 
think for themselves, and to combine intuition with
 
intellectual work. Some of the Sufi students became local
 
political leaders or scholars, but others took vows of
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poverty and wandered in the desert all their lives. Under
 
the influence of teachers such as these, the education
 
offered:in Sufi Schpols in the classical period was not at
 
all the same as the academic education of the time, which
 
trained students in strategies of argument, rational and
 
theological sciences, and religious law (Schimmel, Wind
 
13). The distinction was drawn clearly by Ghazzali, who
 
wrote that "there is a form of knowledge which can be
 
attained by man, which is of such an order that it is to
 
scholastic learning as adulthood is to infancy" (qtd. by
 
Shah, Way 26). Sufi literature was designed to bridge that
 
gap between logical thought and direct, intuitive knowledge
 
of God (Shah, Sufis ix).
 
Rumi
 
A century later, another great Islamic scholar,
 
Jelaluddin Rumi, turned in midlife from orthodox practice
 
to Sufi mysticism. Rumi and his family had fled their homes
 
in Khorassan (now Afghanistan) when Rumi was twelve years
 
old, and had settled in Konya where Rumi became the leader
 
of a famous divinity school (Harvey 19). He was an
 
accomplished scholar, writer and teacher, wealthy and
 
surrounded by devoted disciples. When he was thirty-seven
 
years old, Rumi met a transient dervish teacher, an elderly
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street-corner philosopher named Shams, who asked him such
 
piercing questions that Rumi fell off his donkey in shock.
 
Shams had walked across the deserts from Tabriz, in v ;
 
Persia, burning with his vision of God, searching for a^^^ ;
 
student he would be able to teach. His vision was so
 
advanced that he had not been able to share it with dnyone­
irhe p this teacher who:knew much to be
 
able to teach it has captured the imagination of several
 
current writers. Coleman Barks writes that Shams was
 
charismatic enough to draw crowds but sly enough to
 
disappear whenever it happened (6), and Andrew Harvey adds
 
to the story that Shams was so ferocious and so abrasive
 
that no one could stand to remain near him (22). Shams
 
needed an extraordinarily articulate student who could act
 
as an intermediary between his vision and the assumptions
 
held by ordinary people. He needed a student who could be
 
his mouth, and he found that student in Rumi. But he had to
 
prevent Rumi from using words to mask the Truth. He was
 
relentless in stripping away every defense that Rumi could
 
muster. He said of Rumi, "He speaks fine words, but don't
 
be satisfied with them. Behind each is something you should
 
ask him" (qtd. by Barks in Rumi, Delicious xii).
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 Rumi and Shams entered a trance-like communion that
 
went on for many months, exciting the jealousy of Rumi's
 
students and his children. Shams left town, and Rumi
 
grieved, his nostalgia for God fueled by his longing for
 
the company of his friend. Shams was found in Damascus, and
 
he returned to Konya for another round of communion with
 
Rumi. . . :/// ^ A'- ' Z':
 
Eventually Shams disappeared for good, probably '
 
murdered by Riomi's youngest son (Harvey 29, Schimmel, Wind
 
18). R\imi mourned deeply. But then he developed a
 
realization that Shams' energy and insights still lived,
 
embodied now in his own teaching. He began the outpouring
 
of love-poetry and teaching stories that have endeared him
 
to millions across the world and over the centuries
 
Neoplatonic ideas were again in fashion in the Middle East
 
(Schimmel, Wind 48), and Rumi's stories about his martyred
 
teacher often echo Plato's stories about Socrates.
 
Rumi's stories show human beings in every kind of
 
predicament, all of them metaphors for God's actions.
 
Coleman Barks makes this observation: "For Rumi, anything
 
that humans do, any cruelty, any blindness, resonates with
 
wisdom about the inner life. Any love-impulse especially,
 
however distorted, moves as part of a larger Wanting"
 
: ■ : ■A;; ' tAy t.- AA ■.A^ ;;. .-; Ay,' 
(Rumi, Delicious x). Rumi lived fully the Islamic belief
 
that God's hand is visible in any human action. The problem
 
of teaching and learning was particularly interesting to
 
him, and many of his stories, like the one that opens this
 
chapter, tell about teachers.
 
Coleman Barks brings us an electrifying story about
 
teaching, a Rumi story that was omitted from earlier
 
Western translations of the Mathnawi, Rumi's huge book of
 
teaching stories. The story tells of the day that Juhi
 
decided that the men's side of the mosque was too crowded,
 
so he went in disguised as a woman. The preacher was
 
explicating the letter of the law: that pubic hair must be
 
clipped to the length of a grain of barley in order for
 
prayer to be correct. Juhi asked the woman next to him to
 
reach under his chadar and check his hair. She touched his
 
penis, and she screamed.
 
'Look how my sermon has touched her heart!' the
 
preacher marveled.
 
'I don't think it was her heart that was touched,
 
so much as her hand' Juhi responded. 'But, oh that
 
your words could so touch a heart.' (Rumi, Delicious
 
103)
 
This tale may be more appropriate for presentation in
 
the pedagogy class than in the composition classroom,
 
because it illustrates so precisely the problem with the
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assumption often made by traditional authoritative teachers
 
that lecturing on fine points of law (such as grammatical
 
rules) will educate people. It also raises the question of
 
what kind of assignments will likely "touch a heart" or
 
cause students to produce any meaningful response. Rumi
 
believed, as many composition teachers do today, that the
 
student's personal experience must be engaged to provoke
 
any "touching" expression.
 
Rumi goes on in this story to compare Islamic teachers
 
with goats, and ends with this advice: "Forget your beard
 
and your self-importance. Be an invisible guide, like the '
 
scent of roses that shows where the inner garden is" (104).
 
Rumi is advising teachers not to pride themselves on their
 
power and authority, but to use subtle ways of bringing
 
students to understanding. We will ask today, though,
 
whether Rumi's "inner garden" is a cultural construct, and
 
whether those subtle moves are assimilative.
 
Rumi thought not. He thought that a belief in the
 
underlying unity of all human beings was a prerequisite for
 
social justice. And he did include everyone in his
 
definition. At Rumi's school and Haji Bektash's fourteenth
 
century one, disciples included men and women from all
 
social■classes (Schimmel, Wind 24-25) , in spite of 
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criticism from the community, which felt that education
 
should be reserved for rich men. These Sufis made it clear
 
that women should be educated not only for the benefit of
 
the women, but for the good of society (Shah, Way 30).
 
Rumi, known in Turkey as Mevlana (Arabic for "our
 
master), is probably the best known of all Sufi teachers
 
and writers, as well as one of the most prolific poets in
 
history. Philosophers Denise Breton and Christopher Largent
 
call Rumi the "greatest mystica.1 poet of all time" (8).
 
Nasrudln
 
Another large group of stories, produced by unnamed
 
authors, tell of the antics of Mulla (in Arabic, or Hodja,
 
in Turkish) Nasrudin, a village imam or Sunni spiritual
 
lea.der. Nasrudin goes bumbling around getting into trouble
 
by thinking and acting in ways that are entirely typical of
 
human beings but are inappropriate to the situation. The
 
Sufi student knows, of course, that each story conceals a
 
second interpretation where the Mulla is actually a wise
 
person just pretending to be an idiot (Kayererli 8). Mulla
 
enacts the tradition in which the Sufi teacher mirrors the
 
ineffective thinking of the student. Nasrudin stories are
 
commonly updated and are still being invented today, as
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this character has developed a life that transcends any
 
particular historical period or place.
 
Updated and timeless Nasrudin stories are so coitimon in
 
Sufi circles in the West that it came as a surprise to me
 
to learn, while traveling in Turkey, that there may have
 
been an actual historical Nasrudin who lived in central
 
Anatolia. The government of Turkey, a secular republic
 
usually devoted to modernist ideas of progress, publishes
 
considerable material about this cultural hero, represents
 
a cartoon image of him on a postage stamp and on its web
 
page, and maintains a tomb with his name on it, near Konya,
 
for tourists to visit (Kayeyerli back cover). But Sufis go
 
to the nearby tombs of Rumi and Shams to absorb the
 
rarified vibrations said to emanate from anything these
 
saints have touched, while scoffing at the possibility that
 
Nasrudin's tomb is worth visiting. Nasrudin is seen as a
 
personification of aspects of the mind, not as a person. :
 
However, Mujdat Kayeyerli, writing in one of the booklets
 
recently published by the Turkish government, expresses a
 
very high regard for Nasrudin: "Hodja sifts out and points
 
to ridiculous aspects of persons and of incidents. His
 
solutions do not use force, they use knowledge. All
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elements to be laughed at and to be meditated on gather in
 
one sentence of reply by Hodja" (8)..
 
Nasrudin often taught that people tend to look for
 
things in the wrong places:
 
On one occasion, a neighbor found him down
 
on his knees looking for something.
 
"What have you lost, Mulla?"
 
"My key," said Nasrudin.
 
After a few minutes of searching, the other
 
man said, "Where did you drop it?"
 
"At home."
 
"Then why, for heaven's sake, are you
 
looking here?"
 
"There is more light here." (Shah, Sufis 62,
 
of. Ornstein 144-45)
 
This story might well be used to illustrate the
 
logical fallacy we call "protecting the hypothesis," where
 
investigators reject any research approaches or theories
 
that don't agree with their preconceived plan. A Sufi
 
teacher would allow the key to be symbolic of whatever the
 
student might be seeking. In spiritual teaching, .
 
enlightenment is the kind of emergent goal, impossible to
 
conceptualize, that might be symbolized by the lost key. In
 
our field, "good writing" is a similarly difficult object
 
to find. The story will have a different meaning for every
 
interpreter.
 
To a Sufi way of thinking, chronological accounts of
 
tradition and genre like the one I have just attempted are
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pointless. Authorship is irrelevant in talking about
 
stories that are not seen as products but as vehicles.
 
Neither fame nor wealth is attractive to a Sufi, and the
 
writers whose names I have mentioned are regarded as
 
unfortunate victims of the searchlight of famp (Shah, May
 
286). Shah says, employing typical Sufi analogy, that your
 
Oriental rug belongs on your living room floor, not in
 
Mongolia where its graphics may have originated {Sufis2A).
 
In the same way,; Sufi teaching has value where it is
 
working, not by virtue of its age or authority.
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.CHA&TER FOUR r /The : WhirIpool : ^ ^
 
The Sufi story that opens this paper, "What Befell the 
Three," depicts a teacher who has read extensively 
traveling in search of the Jinn of. the Whirlpool. This, , . ^ 
search takes him into country where nothing is stable, :^ 
nothing.is what it seems, he can't believe anything he 
hears, and even language doesn't.help define any: terrnS:. His 
experience is something like that of composition ■ teachers 
whose work is informed by deconstructive postmodern 
philosophy, except that today's teachers rule put the 
possibility that their whirlpool of relativity is ruled 
over by a Jinn or any organizing principle. 
We could assume, since- this teacher is such a reader,: ,
 
that his teaching centers on the critical reading of texts
 
and an examination of the validity of arguments and the
 
assuraptions' underlying the claims made by writers. This is
 
the .work: done in critical literacy: classrooms today, where
 
students are taught to evaluate arguments.
 
Many composition teachers today battle with the
 
tendency of students to believe what they read, by
 
examining the way that evidence is used to support claims.
 
Some of us ask students to .question the.widely^held
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positivist assumption that we can look objectively at the
 
world. This assumption depends on another: that we know who
 
we are, and that we are stable and coherent observers. Our^
 
assumption that we can describe what we see to another
 
person also depends on a questionable view of language as a
 
transparent medium of communication. All of these kinds of
 
questioning depend on a view of culture and language as
 
socially constructed.
 
Sufi teachers, too, seek ways to help students realize
 
that the acts of relating something to our own previous
 
experience or combining ideas in a way that we have been
 
taught are patterned by social constructs (Shah, Sufis xi).
 
Logical Fallacy
 
Many contemporary composition classes are working on
 
critical thinking projects to stimulate active reading
 
processes that question the assumptions of the writer. In
 
this context, it is not uncommon for composition teachers
 
to include a study of logical fallacies in their teaching
 
of reading strategies.
 
This project is one that Sufis are involved in as
 
well, although with a slightly different emphasis. Sufis
 
are fond of pointing out that even the best logic has its
 
limitations as a guide for behavior. Rumi writes, fOr
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example, that a sick person decides to go a doctor on the
 
basis of logic, but then, placing faith in the doctor,
 
doesn't need logic any more (Shah, S'u^is 120). However,
 
even though logic is not the only way that a Sufi
 
understands, bad logic is the subject of many teaching
 
stories., I think that logical fallacy is an area in which
 
Sufi stories could be of great use in the composition
 
classroom.
 
I have found that students are interested in fallacy
 
because they are eager for tools that will help them see in
 
new ways. But working with lists of Latin names or
 
technical terms is difficult. It seems to me that the
 
students remember the names of fallacies-best when they
 
have an analogy or a visual image to work with. They
 
remember "slippery slope" and "straw man" with ease, but
 
they don't remember "post hoc, ergo propter hoc" or
 
"equivocation." I have found that teaching students to
 
recognize fallacy depends on giving them memorable
 
examples. But as long as I am Still assigning good
 
professional writing for my students to read (as I am still
 
clinging to some vestige of the storehouse model of
 
learning), I am at a loss for examples of bad reasoning.
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I suspect that Islamic teachers in the Middle Ages may
 
well have faced the same problem. They too built an
 
educational system on classical Greek and Roman rhetorical
 
foundations, devoting a great deal of attention to legal
 
argument (Schimmel, Wind 13). The Sufi teachers departed
 
from that model by teaching fallacy in a new way, by
 
offering silly little stories that illustrate the
 
fallacies.
 
The fallacy of consistency, for example, is
 
illustrated by stpries with the theme that the appropriate
 
answer to a question is different at different times. The
 
Turkish government publication has a quick one, called "One
 
Must Keep His Word."
 
I've edited it here for spelling and punctuation:
 
They asked Hodja how old he was. He said he
 
was forty. A few years later they asked him
 
again, and again he said he was forty.
 
They said, "Come, Hodja, you were forty long
 
ago. Are you still forty?"
 
Hodja said, "I am a man of my word. I never
 
go back on my word. . ." (Kayayerli 67)
 
This story appears in many versions in Sufi
 
literature, probably because a Sufi teacher does not
 
hesitate to change a story to make it meaningful to a
 
particular community of students. Using it in my
 
composition classroom, I might leave it in its original
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form as an example of a teaching from a far-distant
 
culture, or I might change the main character to my mother
 
or Jack Benny, and change the age to thirty-nine. In any of
 
these forms it would help me illustrate why consistency is
 
not always desirable.
 
A Sufi approach would be to present the story first
 
and ask the students to figure out how it relates to other
 
materials in the curriculum. A variation of that approach
 
for composition students who have already learned something
 
about logic and fallacy would be to present the story and
 
ask them to identify the problems with the logic that it
 
presents. I can imagine maintaining a file of Sufi stories,
 
each on an index card perhaps, and inviting students to
 
check them out and solve the problem, possibly for extra-

credit points.
 
Any teacher who wants to try this approach to teaching
 
logic can find hundreds of examples of fallacy stories in
 
the Sufi literature. Many of them deal in different ways .
 
with the problem of faulty cause and effect. One story
 
shows Hodja eating rice with his hands. A man asked him,
 
"Why are you eating with your five fingers?"
 
Hodja answered, "Because I don't have six
 
fingers" (Kayayerli 89). Clearly, Hodja's response doesn't
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address the nature of cause in the same way that the
 
questioner intended; it is so misdirected that it might
 
even be a case of equivocation.
 
Another story I might use in talking about
 
fallacies of causation is called "Balance of the World,"
 
and it might be of interest to students studying urban
 
planning or civil engineering.
 
One of the villagers asked Hodja why people
 
travel in different directions when they leave
 
for work in the morning. Hodja was proud that
 
his reputation for wisdom brought people to ask
 
him questions like this. He said, "Very simple.
 
The world would lose its balance if everybody
 
went the same direction."(reworded from Kayayerli
 
90)
 
Here we see a situation where an assumption of
 
causation is based on a set of faulty premises: that the
 
world is unstable and that people make an effort to hold it
 
upright. This story may also illustrate the fallacy of
 
false authority, for it seems that a question about town
 
zoning might call for some other wisdom that of a holy man
 
accustomed to looking at a larger picture' than the local
 
map.
 
Hodja addresses the fallacy of basing a conclusion on
 
too little evidence (hasty generalization) with this story:
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Someone said to Hodja, "People are strange.
 
In the summer they,can't stand the heat, but^in
 
the winter they hate the cold."
 
Hodja replied, "Have you heard anyone
 
complain about spring?" (reworded slightly from
 
Kayayerli 91)
 
We see here Hodja's opinion that the speaker is making
 
a generalization about people, but that their comments
 
about two seasons are not enough to tell the whole story.
 
On the other hand (and there always is another hand when
 
we're dealing with a Sufi story), the speaker may not have
 
been generalizing; she may have been contrasting winter
 
complaints with summer ones. In that case, this story is
 
about the fallacy of suppressed alternatives. By looking
 
only at the binary between two seasons of the year, the
 
speaker created a dichotomy that excluded spring.
 
Equivocation might be illustrated by the story of
 
'Hodja's Turkey:"
 
Hodja went to the market and saw a little
 
bird for sale. The owners were asking a lot of
 
money for it. Hodja asked what the bird could do
 
that made it so valuable.
 
"This parrot can talk," they said.
 
Hodja rushed home and got his turkey. He
 
took it to the market, and he asked three times
 
the price of the parrot. People were laughing at
 
him.
 
"Why are you laughing? You are willing to
 
pay a fortune for a bird the size of my finger,
 
but you don't want to pay a fit price for my
 
large bird."
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"But that bird:isa parrot. It can talk.
 
What does your bird do?" they asked.
 
"It meditates." (Reworded slightly from
 
Kayayarli 53)
 
Here students may see that Hodja has interpreted the
 
word "do" in a different way than the owners of the parrot,
 
possibly because of his background in religious studies.
 
His belief that his turkey is doing something more valuable
 
than what the parrot does is based on his holy-man bias
 
that meditating is better than talking. The issue of size
 
is raised here as well, and it appears to be another kind
 
of fallacy, a red herring. After all, why would a big bird
 
that could talk be more valuable than a small bird that
 
could talk?
 
Using Sufi stories rather than lists of rules to talk
 
about logic could offer an advantage to the social-

epistemic rhetorician in that the stories raise questions
 
about why a person would commit a fallacy. In other words,
 
fallacies may be presented as social processes operating in
 
relationship to other processes such as consistent
 
deductive reasoning or desires to persuade or to save face,
 
rather than as a sin against some absolute system of logic.
 
A relativistic approach to the teaching of fallacy is
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consistent with the idea that our style of arguing is
 
culturally constructed.
 
Positivist Views
 
Our assumption that we can view the world objectively
 
has been supported by a modernist tradition in which we
 
developed a great trust in scientific method. We have
 
thought that we could achieve objectivity by narrowing our
 
view and limiting the variables. But the common-sense
 
realist idea that we can believe what we see characterized
 
human thought long before the modern period. Back in the
 
twelfth century, the Sufi teacher Ghazzali introduced a
 
teaching story to draw students' attention to the disputes
 
that arise when people believe their own sense-knowledge.
 
It is as if some blind men, hearing that an
 
elephant had come to their town, should go and
 
examine it. The only knowledge of it which-they
 
can obtain comes through the sense of touch; so
 
one handles the animal's leg, another his tusk,
 
another his ear, and, according to their several
 
perceptions, pronounce it to be a column, a thick
 
pole, or a quilt, each taking a part for the
 
whole. (Al-Ghazzali 20)
 
This story is anti-positivist in that it depicts all
 
observers of a phenomenon as positioned and the language
 
they use indescribing it as unrelated to the thing itself.
 
I have used a version of it in my composition and critical
 
thinking classrooms to begin a conversation about how we
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know what we believe we know. I can't think of any other
 
technique or: a reading coitimonly used in composition: classes
 
that cuts to the bottom line of this issue so quickly.
 
The Status of the Experiencing Subject
 
By writing a story in which the observers are blind,
 
Ghazzali raises another question that is of interest to
 
postmodern compositioh theorists: what is the status of the
 
experiencing subject? Is it possible for a person to see
 
any part of reality?
 
James Berlin's answer is that the individual's
 
consciousness is- determined by cultural forces. "Each
 
individual occupies a position at the intersection of a
 
multitude of discourses, which Freire, in the manner of
 
Barthes, calls codes,'' he says :{Rhetorics 98). He sees
 
individuals as irredeemably immersed in history, as wrapped
 
up in ail the conditioning that has produced their habits
 
of thought. This idea has been expressed by Shah in similar
 
terms, as he comments that the ordinary person is
 
completely caught up in the alternating personalities of
 
various social roles that he or she plays in different
 
circumstances {Sufis 349).
 
Berlin proposes {Rhetorics 124) a composition course
 
unlike those "that insist that each student look within to
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discover a unique self," a course that "argues that only
 
through understanding the workings of culture in shaping
 
consciousness can students ever hope to achieve any degree
 
of singularity." Sufi teachers do some of the same kind of
 
work to make'students aware' that the "self" they ordinarily
 
identify and imagine to be their own and only self is an
 
artificial construct. Shah calls it the "commanding self,"
 
and the "conventional self:" a personality shaped by
 
cultural conditioning and characterized by emotional
 
reactions, opinions and preoccupations {Learning 42,74).
 
He says that the student must attain knowledge of the self,
 
beginning with that secondary self, and learn how to set it
 
aside at will {Learning 30). He maintains that students
 
cannot reach real understanding until they understand that
 
they are "largely a bundle of what are nowadays called
 
conditionings—fixed ideas and prejudices, automatic
 
responses. . . which have occurred through the training of
 
others" {Sufis 115)'. This concept of the secondary self
 
sounds to me very .much like the same complex of influences
 
that Berlin refers to when he says that "each individual
 
occupies a position at the intersection of a multitude of
 
discourses" {Rhetorics 98).
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Lester Faigley sees a current move in composition away
 
from admiring the individuality of the student occurring as
 
a response to postmodern theory advanced by philosophers
 
such as Jacques Derrida and Jurgen Habermas. Faigley
 
writes:
 
As a result, many in composition have
 
abandoned the modernist privileging of individual
 
expression and mental processes and have turned
 
to the examination of meanings and practices
 
linked with certain discourses that are
 
historically produced. (22)
 
However, Faigley observes that this postmodern move
 
has not been accepted by the many writing teachers who want
 
students to compose as though they were stable and coherent
 
or who believe in the writer as an autonomous individual
 
capable of agency, authentic voice and self-realization
 
(15). Essay prompts in classrooms and standardized tests
 
still typically begin, "In a coherent and focused essay,
 
show (or describe or analyze or discuss) . . . giving an
 
example from your own experience." This kind of
 
assignment still constructs a modernist student subject.
 
Although Faigley sets up this dichotomy as a problem
 
that divides composition teachers into opposing camps,
 
requiring "surrender" on the part of the modernists (15),
 
in practice many of us encourage students to understand the
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assumptions carried by their cultural heritage and then to
 
write about their experience in a realistic way. We use
 
both points of view, the modern and the postmodern, at the
 
same time. Possibly we do not agree with Faigley that
 
writing for self-discovery and intellectual self-

realization are necessarily identified with a stable and
 
constant self.
 
Sufi teachers do not limit themselves to any one
 
position in this debate, either. They teach that the human
 
mind develops partly because of the impacts it has been
 
exposed to and partly because of its ability to use those
 
impacts. Sufis, like critical literacy teachers, are
 
working on a project to make the student aware of cultural
 
conditioning. But they believe that by becoming aware, by
 
pushing that conditioning to one side, the student finds an
 
underlying creative individuality (Shah, Sufis xi).
 
For a Sufi, the incoherence of the subject is a
 
discovery to be celebrated, because it allows the
 
individual more than one point of view. Coleman Barks
 
writes of the contribution of this concept to the ecstatic
 
power of Rumi's poetry, "an ecstasy melting the confinement
 
of the ego into a larger, elastic, cross-pollinating dance
 
of the selves" (Rumi, Open xij. Rumi writes of the self as
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playing multiple roles when he observes, "You're sitting,
 
here with us, but you're also out walking in a field at
 
dawn" {Open 65). His words could be read as a mundane
 
observation that any teacher might make, that some of the
 
students whose bodies are present are mentally somewhere
 
else, but Rumi comes back again and again to this idea of
 
the person as larger than the body. He and other Sufis
 
often picture the outer self of a human being as something
 
like a suit of clothes. "You're the diver's clothes, lying
 
empty on the beach," he writes (Open 65).
 
The Problematics of Language
 
Whatever the nature of the individual writer, language
 
itself is a problem to postmodern theorists and to Sufi
 
teachers alike. Berlin tells us that in the light of
 
postmodern philosophies advanced by Saussure and Derrida,
 
critical readers can no longer mistake language for "the
 
transparent conduit of transcendental truths" {Rhetorics
 
68). Language always carries out the ideological projects
 
of the group in power, in his opinion/ and our blindness to
 
this fact has been "one of the supreme conquests of the
 
Enlightenment"(xvii). One vitally important project of the
 
critical literacy classroom, as he sees it, is to study and
 
critique signifying practices. . . .
 
. . '.'i ■ b'i . -Y : ■ 
Dispelling the myth that language can represent either
 
everyday reality or transcendent truth is a major project
 
of the Sufi pedagogy as well. Rumi, in particular, often
 
echoes the Platonic idea that words deceive, that they are
 
too abstract and conceptual to represent real objects
 
(Barks in Rumi, Open xi).
 
Rumi's story of the travelers and the grapes is one of
 
the most commonly told Sufi stories about language and its
 
failure in situations where communication is needed:
 
Four men were given a piece of money.
 
The first was a Persian. He said: "I will
 
buy with this some angur."
 
The second was an Arab. He said: "No,
 
because I want inab."
 
The third was a Turk. He said: "I do not
 
want inab, I want uzum."
 
The fourth was a Greek. He said: "I want
 
stafil."
 
Because they did not know what lay behind
 
the names of things, these four started to fight.
 
They had information but no knowledge. (Shah,
 
Sufis 103)
 
This story illustrates that the words used by the
 
travelers present an appearance that each wants something
 
different. Their words are unconnected to any real object,
 
as Derrida observes about words in general (Berlin,
 
Rhetorics 61). The speakers cannot resolve their
 
differences, and they fight. It's a common situation,
 
representing the picture of human differences that Habermas
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and Lyotard debate, and that Bruffee and Trimbur address in
 
their work on collaboration. What can happen here? Can any
 
rational consensus be reached, or will one individual
 
overpower the others?
 
The Sufi solution is a different one, for it turns out
 
that the travelers all want the same thing:
 
One man of wisdom present could have
 
reconciled them all, saying: "I can fulfill the
 
needs of all of you, with one and the same piece
 
of money. If you honestly give me your trust,
 
your one coin will become as four; and four at
 
odds will become as pne united."
 
Such a man would know that each in his own
 
language wanted the same thing, grapes. (Shah,
 
Sufis 103)
 
I have a difficult time swallowing this Deus ex
 
Machina resolution to the story. Where is this man of
 
wisdom to be found when we need him? How would we recognize
 
him and why would we trust him with our money? And why does
 
he present such a positivist view of language? A few words
 
that initially caused contention are revealed to be
 
interchangeable units between one language and another. The
 
representation that heteroglossia can so easily be resolved
 
is disturbing to me, because I believe that each language
 
allows its speakers to think and to desire in a different
 
way. I doubt that the travelers all meant the same thing.
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even if all were thinking of grapes. Probably one wanted
 
Concords and one wanted Thompson's seedless or some other
 
local variety.
 
My objections are based on a secular reading of the
 
story, however. That one thing that everyone wants, grapes,
 
is symbolic in Sufi literature for the drunken state of the
 
individual in union with God. Rumi has raised a question of
 
relativity but solved it with a mystical, Platonic unity.
 
Although I can imagine using this story in a composition
 
classroom to raise questions about how people communicate,
 
I am fairly sure the conversation would remain open-ended.
 
In its complete form, this story does not represent
 
any of the positions that a postmodern philosopher would
 
argue. It allows for none of the rational discussion that
 
Lyotard values, and it does not represent a postmodern
 
critique of language that Habermas or Derrida could accept,
 
because it allows for a unifying foundational truth beyond
 
language (Berlin 61).
 
Foundational Truth
 
Berlin, in his discussion of requirements for his
 
critical literacy course, draws upon Derrida's argument
 
that there can be no "unitary concept" (61). Berlin reports
 
that Derrida rejects any attempts to locate "the foundation
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■for 	some essential truths that are the same everywhere and 
always" (61) . Thus Derrida rejects the idea that people 
could all want the same thing. As we have seen in the story 
of the grapes, Sufis have come to different conclusions. A 
Sufi might say that foundational truth exists, but it is 
not accessible by language, and it is not where we have 
been looking for it. 
This idea of looking for truth in all the wrong places 
is a common theme in the teaching stories (as we have seen 
in Chapter Three with the story of Mulla Nasrudin looking 
for his key) . But from a ;Sufi point of view, to say that 
there is no absolute truth is;a self-contradictory 
statement, a trap set by language, for the statement itself 
masquerades as an absolute truth. It is like saying that ' 
all generalizations are false. Nevertheless, in a Sufi 
system as well as in a postmodern one, individual claims to 
knowledge of absolute truth are suspect. As it happens, 
there's a Sufi teaching story about this very dilemma: 
whose Truth? 'l/' 
"Laws as such do not make people better," 
said Nasrudin to the King; "they must practice 
certain things, in order to become attuned to 
inner truth. This form of truth resembles , 
apparent truth only slightly." ^ ■ 
But the King decided that he could, and 
would, make people observe the truth. He could ; 
make them practice truthfulness. : 
 His city was entered by a bridge. On this he
 
built a gallows. The following day, when the
 
gates were opened at dawn, the Captain of the
 
Guard was stationed with a squad of troops to
 
. : V :v:v BKami-^ entered.
 
An announcement was made: "Everyone will be
 
questioned. If he tells the truth he will be ,
 
allowed to enter. If he lies, he will be hanged."
 
Nasrudin stepped forward.
 
"Where are you going?"
 
"I am on my way," said Nasrudin slowly, "to
 
be hanged."
 
"We don't believe you!" '
 
' "Very well, if I have told a lie, hang me!"
 
"But if we hang you for lying, we will have
 
made what you said come true!"
 
"That's right: now you know what truth is —
 
YOUR truth!" (Shah, Exploits 7)
 
Nasrudin is pointing out in this story thah^^^^ ^ ^ ^ ^^ : ; ; •
 
transcendental Truth bears little, if any, resemblance to
 
the kinds of temporal truth that are legislated, promoted
 
or enforced by societies and governments. The King,
 
however, does not recognize the difference. He believes
 
that he can use his embargo to coerce his subjects to align
 
themselves with truth. The story could be seen as a case
 
of equivocation, where the word "truth" is being used in
 
different ways by the two characters, or as an exhibit of
 
amphibole, where by shifting into the future tense Nasrudin
 
unmasks the looseness of the rule the King has made.
 
For those of us who have weighed the critiques of
 
postmodern philosophy, it appears that Nasrudin recognizes
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the existence of local standards when he informs the king .
 
that his truth is personal. This is a move that postmodern
 
philosophers would approve, because they situate every kind
 
of evaluation in a historical perspective. Teachers of
 
composition have moved in the direction of recognizing
 
standards as localized by separating the ideas of
 
grammatical error and moral rectitude, and by observing
 
that people speak differently in the different discourse
 
communities that they occupy and visit.
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CHAPTER FIVE: The Magic Mirror
 
In -the teaching story that opens this paper/ one of
 
the dervishes, Dho-Agha, who had always looked at the world
 
.upside-down, went, to the land of the :Magic Mirror, where ..he
 
hung by his heels- and vrewed eternal truths reflected in a
 
mirror constructed from the thoughts of.mankind (Shah,
 
Tales (103).
 
The idea expressed in this story, that Dho-Agha's
 
peculiar .actions- represent one of humanity's valid ways of. ..
 
knowing, ,is evidence of the Sufi inclusion of Platonic
 
teachings in their narrative of knowing. Through an
 
indirect, reflective way of looking, realities that are
 
otherwise invisible may be glimpsed, but, as the story
 
warns, not always. Dho-Agha's students, working with only
 
the fossilized outer form of his. teaching, with only the
 
method, failed to reach ultimate truth, but saw in their
 
mirrors only their own faces. This description is an
 
extremely limited account of a teaching system that, at its
 
height, was Platonic in a much vaster sense, informed by a
 
belief that all tangible reality participates in an
 
invisible reality, a Form behind all'forms.
 
This Sufi summary of an educational activity is
 
reminiscent of Berlin's description of the Platonic '
 
59
 
rhetoric he locates at the center of ''Expressionist"
 
textbooks of the 1970s. The course plans were created by
 
teachers who believe, like Plato, in the existence of Truth
 
and urge the'student to find,it by exploring private
 
experience ("Gontemporary" 240). The textbooks suggest the
 
use of a dialectic method to get rid of beliefs and
 
assuitiptions false to the self, and they encourage students,
 
to employ me analogy to approximate tbuths that
 
cannot be expressed directly. Their approach can be
 
classified as Platonic, Berlin explains, because in a
 
Platonic scheme Truth cannot be conveyed by language, so
 
the purpose of discourse is not to transmit Truth but to
 
remove error so that Truth can be found. He adds that the
 
rhetoric may be disruptive, asking the student to give up
 
previously-cherished assumptions and beliefs (239). .
 
Berlin's perspective, of course, is that of a New
 
Rhetorician: his purpose is to shake up old ways of
 
thinking, but not to find any underlying Truth. He
 
considers any foundational base to be another layer of
 
error. I'd like to argue that Berlin's description of
 
.Platonic threads in composition is similar to Shami's story
 
in that it notes the visible and static forms of a teaching
 
method without capturing the spirit of it. I believe that a
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larger version of the Platonic mindset than a belief in, :
 
"authentic self" has been at work in our culture and in •
 
many composition classrooms in recent years, much as it was
 
at the height of the classical Sufi period. In the last
 
half of the twentieth century, Americans have referred to
 
this heightened awareness of process and wholeness as "the
 
paradigm shift."
 
The Sufi sense of the invisible world of flux and
 
interconnection is not extremely evident in the teaching
 
stories because the stories are used at the elementary ;
 
level of their education system. The mystical and ecstatic
 
material is introduced later, and it is often expressed in
 
poetry. Sometimes, though, Jelaluddin Rumi attaches a
 
Platonic moral to -a story.
 
When, for example, Riomi tells the story of the
 
disruptive student who goes into the mosque disguised as a
 
woman (see Chapter Three, page 34), he goes on to advise
 
teachers to be "the scent of roses that shows where the
 
inner garden is" (Delicious 103). He moves from a story
 
expressed in terms of everyday activities to a statement
 
that there is an invisible inner world to be discovered.
 
When he retells Ghazzali's story of the elephant (see
 
Chapter Four, page 47), he suggests a solution to the
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problem of positionality: the unchanging light of Moses, a
 
metaphor he has used often to represent divine love
 
(Schimmel, Wind 187). His version of the story goes like
 
this:
 
The light of Moses is here and now, inside you.
 
Pharoah as well. The ceramic lamp and wick
 
change
 
But the light's the same. If you keep focusing
 
On the translucent chimney that surrounds the
 
flame.
 
You will see only the Many, the colors
 
And their variations. Focus on a light within
 
The flame. You are that.
 
Where you perceive from should not change what
 
you perceive.
 
Unless you're in a dark room.
 
Some Hindus brought an elephant to exhibit.
 
They kept it in an unlit house. Many people came
 
and went
 
Through the darkness. They couldn't see anything.
 
So they felt with their hands. One person's palm
 
Touched the trunk. "It's like the downspout on a
 
roof."
 
One felt an ear. "More like a fan."
 
The leg. "I find it round and solid like the
 
column on a temple."
 
One touches the back. "An enormous throne."
 
One says straight, another crooked.
 
If each had a candle, differences would
 
disappear. [We Are Three 40)
 
In this poem, Rumi represents the idea that all knowledge
 
is situated by showing a scene in which the limited sense
 
perceptions of people cause them to disagree. But, he
 
says, there is a light within each of us that can reveal
 
the one unified Truth. That light is Moses: it is love.
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 It's a Platonic solution to the problem of knowing, a
 
solution that suggests that when people look by the light,
 
of love for one another, they all see the same thing.
 
Sometimes Rumi locates this Reality within, and '
 
sometimes he describes it as another place, outside the
 
binary divisions of human influence and power struggles.
 
Out beyond ideas of right doing and wrong doing.
 
There is a field.
 
I'll meet you there.
 
When the soul lies down in that grass.
 
The world is too full to talk about.
 
Ideas, language, even the phrase each other,
 
■ : Doesn't make any sense. {Open 82) 
Rumi sees a vision of another place beyond the
 
conditioning of culture, a place where people are all
 
united. Then again, maybe it is not a place, but an action.
 
The wheel that lifts some up
 
and drags others down,
 
we're not riding it anymore.
 
We've jumped off that
 
good-and-bad. {Birdsong 60)
 
. : Rumi's poetry is full of movement in which every
 
individual action is a metaphor for a larger movement, It's
 
an idea something like the concept of "holomovement," a
 
word coined by physicist David Bohm to reconcile quantum
 
mechanics and relativity theory. In Bohm's Neoplatonic
 
theoretical construct, matter, energy, and mind are all
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manifestations, of an,invisibje ofder,: ,t^ is - the primary
 
reality• Modenn-day Sufis often point to Bphm's ,work as
 
evidence that the Western world is finally catching up to
 
what the classical Sufi teachers knew all along (Breton and
 
Largent 25). ,'
 
Nonlocality is another concept from new physics
 
that is reminiscent of Platonic and Sufi understandings.
 
This theory says that there is an invisible connection
 
linking particles that are traveling in opposite directions
 
(Breton and Largent 15).,1 The search for connectivity
 
behind apparently discrete phenomena is central to Sufi
 
,thought - and, of course, very different from the current
 
tendency in composition to define all observations and
 
values as local.
 
Sufi work not only expresses a reproduction of the
 
most abstract Platonic ideas; it does so by way of many of
 
the same symbols that Plato used. Rumi, in particular,
 
recreates Plato's works in considerable detail. His
 
teacher. Shams, is a figure that closely resembles
 
Socrates. Shams goes around barefoot, sometimes in
 
disguise, pretending to be ignorant and asking people
 
questions until they are so disturbed by his subversive
 
activities that they put him to death. Rumi's stories about
 
him, like Plato's stories about Socrates, are almost all
 
dialogue.
 
Other Sufi teachers, including Mulla Nasrudin, emulate
 
Socrates by flouting the ordinary lecture methods of their
 
time; in fact they criticize oratory and poke fun at some
 
of the most respected figures of the country. They enact a
 
dialectic by a method of systematic doubting, looking for
 
the Truth that they believe their students have forgotten.
 
Sometimes they present amusing or erotic analogies to make
 
a point. Sometimes they are possessed with a 'divine
 
madness' and talk of God as 'the Beloved.'
 
The many similarities between Plato's stories and
 
those of the Sufi masters are not an accident, for the
 
Sufis read Plato and referred to him as their "First
 
Master."Sufi mystics, familiar with the Socratic method of
 
teaching as Plato presents it in Phaedrus and other
 
dialogues, made use of Socratic techniques for bringing
 
students to a knowledge of Truth.
 
Socrates and the Sufis start right off questioning the
 
student, somewhat as many composition teachers do in first-

day talk where they explore the students', literacies, or in
 
classes that begin with narrative writing about personal
 
experience. Sufi and Socratic teaching styles enact a
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 cbnscious belief that the student already;knows the Truth
 
but must be led to rediscover it. Our contemporary version,
 
as we have seen in Freire's problerti-posing with Brazilian
 
peasants, also implies that the student has arrived with
 
Sbrae latent knowledge and fluency (see Chapter;Six, page
 
79, for an example).
 
: At the beginning of Phaedrus, Socrates arid his student
 
.are walking in the country, barefoot, (229E) and acting out
 
the first of these strategies. Socrates asks, "Where do
 
you come from, Phaedrus, my friend, and where are you
 
going?" (227), questions that could be taken as merely a
 
polite greeting. But Ghazzali echoes the questions and
 
exposes their profundity in the opening lines of his
 
Alchemy of Happiness, where he comments on the saying of
 
the Prophet Mohammed that one must know oneself in order to
 
know God. Ghazzali writes, "Real self-knowledge consists in
 
knowing the following things: What art thou in thyself, and
 
from whence hast thou come? Whither art thou going?" (5-6).
 
Socrates' greeting now might be seen to be connected to his
 
later statement that he is not interested in authority as a
 
source of knowledge, that he must first know himself
 
(229D).
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As the Greek dialogue unfolds, Phaedrus confides that
 
he has been listening to Lysias, a famous orator. Socrates
 
wants his student to think critically about what he has
 
heard, but he doesn't attack the problem directly. He
 
realizes that Phaedrus is blinded by Lysias' cleverness and
 
that he wants to be entertained more than he wants to be
 
educated. So Socrates proceeds by pretending to share
 
Phaedrus' enthusiasm for the speech and by continuing to
 
ask questions. These strategies are very similar to one
 
used by Sufi teachers, who often begin by asking their
 
students questions and by praising them (Shah, Veiled 25).
 
Socrates, by calling himself an idiot and by
 
continuing to pretend innocence, both encourages his
 
student to develop his own authority and disorients him by
 
playing a role that is unexpected from a teacher. The
 
purpose — and interactive teachers have been using this
 
ploy ever since — seems to be to get students to think and
 
to take an active part in their own education.
 
Similar feints are used by Mulla (or Hodja) Nasrudin,
 
the hero of hundreds of Sufi teaching stories. While
 
Nasrudin is never as overt as Socrates in referring to
 
himself as an idiot, his activities are not what students
 
expect from a learned holy man. They parody for the student
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the workings of an ignorant mind. The Mulla, although he
 
has studied Islamic law, always disguises himself as ah
 
ordinary man or even an idiotic one.
 
Socrates takes up the theme of disguise as he begins
 
his first speech in Phaedrus, in which he takes a position
 
he does not actually support. "I shall cover my head
 
before I begin: then I can rush through my speech at top
 
speed without looking at you and breaking down for shame,"
 
he says (237A). Taking on the assumptions of Lysias'
 
speech, that love and lust are the same thing, Socrates
 
creates a parody of his speech and presents that to
 
Phaedrus to see whether the boy will recognize that the
 
argument is wrong.
 
In this way Plato provides a model for story
 
characters like Nasrudin who are presented as absurdly
 
wrong-headed in, for example, looking for things in
 
impossible places. There is also a tradition in Islam of
 
the philosopher-king traveling in disguise, dressed in
 
rags, begging, often giving extraordinary blessings to
 
those who give him alms.
 
But parody and disguise don't work to illumine
 
Phaedrus. He continues to express uncritical approval of
 
Socrates' speech. Socrates goes so far now as to point out
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to him directly: "That was a terrible theory, Phaedrus, a
 
terrible . theory that you introduced and compelled.vme tO'
 
, expound''.;(2^^4 . : ,
 
.(iSbcra his direct. :sbatement has
 
:not enlightened Phaedrus, then constructs-an elaborate
 
analogy to explain the nature of the soul, Love,.Truth, and
 
Being. He presents a vivid picture of the soul as a
 
charioteer driven by a bad horse and a good one, of its .. .
 
fall from union with God, of its regrowth of wings when it
 
experiences Love. Some of the same images appear in Sufi
 
work, as when Rumi portrays the love that took the Prophet
 
Mohammed back to Allah as a mysterious flying horse
 
(Schimmel, Wind 193).
 
For the Sufis, the use of direct statement is
 
similarly brief. A great deal of indirect teaching is used
 
first, to force students to exercise their processing
 
powers. Analogy and metaphor are the major teaching tools
 
in a pedagogy where little stories ask the student to make
 
large cognitive leaps. Teachers wait for the students to
 
perform the mental gymnastics necessary to examine their
 
previous assumptions in order to understand the stories,
 
confident that mastering the process of working out the .
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implicature will enable the student to see through cultural
 
conditioning and assumptions and bo think in creative ways
 
Contemporary teachers, particularly expressivist
 
composition teachers, also use analogy. Peter Elbow's
 
cooking analogy, where the writer is lighting matches under
 
thimt'les {Writing 67) is a famous example.
 
^7 • ; F Sufis face an additional pedagogical
 
prbblem that share: finding a vehicle for
 
fevealihg foundational Truth. Since the soul already knows
 
the Truth,: it does hbt^"^ be told what it is ? It ne^cjs
 
only to be helped to remember. However, the problem of
 
restoring the memory of the Unity is compounded by the fact
 
that worldly language is inadequate. Socrates and Rumi
 
both speak of the problem of language. Socrates tells
 
Phaedrus that it is impossible to talk about Truth
 
directly. He claims, "Of that place beyond the heavens,
 
none of our earthly poets has yet sung, and none shall sing
 
worthily. . v. .It is there that true Being dwe11s, without
 
color or shape, that cannot be touched." (247 C). Rumi
 
speaks of the inadequacy of words in this way: "The
 
dictionaries have no entry to express my love. If a road
 
can be described, it is not the lover's road" (Poems, 1,1).
 
Rumi is saying here, as in many other stories and verses,
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that the place beyond this world where Ipye exists is a
 
place beyond words.
 
This central Platonic idea, that Truth can be learned
 
but that it cannot be taught, underlies the experiential
 
psychology of Sufi teaching and also the idea of a
 
teacherless writing class presented by Peter Elbow in
 
Writing Without Teachers.
 
Finally, we cannot overlook the image of the mirror.
 
In Phaedrus (255D), Socrates refers to the teacher as a
 
lover who is a mirror of the divine. Rumi, when he meets
 
his teacher, sees him immediately as a mirror of God. He
 
says to Shams, "Shamsulhaqq [Sun of Divine Truth], if I see
 
in your clear mirror/ Aught but God, I am worse than an
 
infidel!" He recognizes the apostasy in his words and yet
 
continues, "Whether it be infidelity or Islam, listen:/ You
 
are either the light of God or God!" (Schimmel 21). Thus
 
Rumi sees in Shams a divine being, and in true Sufi
 
fashion, prefers his personal ecstatic vision to the letter
 
of Islamic law. , ,
 
For classical Sufi teachers, a tension existed between
 
their understanding of dynamic process and the religious
 
orthodoxy of medieval Islam. Their radical pedagogy put
 
them at risk for being executed for heresy, as Hallaj was.
 
■■ ■ 11 ■ 
It's the same risk, in fact, that Socrates faced when he
 
was accused of failing to honor the state-approved gods of
 
his day. Thinking outside the dominant paradigm was a
 
dangerous activity.
 
In our day, a different version of the same tension
 
exists. Our experience in religious traditions where God
 
has "chosen people," where God's will has been claimed as
 
an excuse for wars and oppression, makes us suspicious of
 
claims of supernatural knowledge. Our official academic
 
paradigm of acceptable ways of knowing is limited to the
 
empirical and the logical. Invisible connections, spiritual
 
understandings, and intuition are not highly regarded. In
 
this climate, teachers who acknowledge the possibility of a
 
reality we cannot know become the objects of suspicion.
 
Although we are practical, we have not been willing to
 
abandon all of our ideals; we are not whole-heartedly
 
united in rejecting foundational truth. Faigley's concept
 
of the "ethical subject," Berlin's call for social justice,
 
and Theresa Ebert's "resistance postmodernism" (Berlin,
 
Rhetorics 75) are examples of moves that composition
 
teachers are making to limit the range of relativity
 
suggested by postmodern philosophy. Each of these ideas
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places some set of values beyond the pale of varying
 
opinions.
 
I believe we are also making some Platonic moves when
 
we theorize invisible and dynamic organizational
 
structures, systems in which mind is an active participant,
 
behind our pedagogies or the acts of reading and writing.
 
Marilyn Cooper's "Ecology of Writing," for example,
 
envisions composition not as a cognitive process but as an
 
interlocking matrix of dynamic socially-constituted
 
systems. Like Bohm's holomovement, Cooper's model is
 
constantly developing, being made and remade by writers in
 
the act of writing. Writing depends upon a web of systems:
 
systems of ideas, of purposes, of interpersonal
 
interactions, of cultural norms, of textual forms (369-70).
 
Cooper's model does not privilege any particular version of
 
truth, but it suggests a more complex way of looking at the
 
process of writing than a linear model and one more in
 
keeping with the new paradigms of thought that are
 
developing outside our field.
 
Our habits of mind, our established paradigms, keep
 
pulling us back, however, to reductive thinking, binary
 
oppositions, linear progressions and fragmentations. We
 
want to reduce teaching to a replicable method.
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I see a dramatic -example of Platonic teaching that has 
been, misinterpreted and .reduced:to metliod in . the United 
States in our. reading pf the. work of PaUlo. Ereire. Freire . ■ 
describes;his- work as a problem-posing education where : 
. students, "come tb .. see , the world hot as a static reality, . ■ 
but as a reality in process, in transformation" (Oppressed, 
71). He goes on to refer to students as "beings who are . 
authentic only when engaged in inquiry and creative 
transformation" (71). He defines the terms under which 
students may be authentic, but he does not deny the 
possibility. And he calls for "unity within diversity" 
(Heart, 86-87, 106) as the realization that can lead to 
victory over discrimination against minorities. 
Freire's work in teaching both literacy and social ■ 
:unrest to Brazilian peasants was extremely effective, so 
much so that he was exiled from Brazil in 1964. He 
described his method: he looked at the culture in which his
 
students lived and presented to them some words that would
 
interest them so much as to be "generative." The students
 
learned very rapidly to read and write and also to enter
 
into an intellectual distancing that allowed them to
 
diagnose and correct the culture that oppressed them.
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Patricia Bizzell describes in Academic Discourse and
 
Critical Consciousness how composition teachers hete in the
 
United States adopted Freire's methods, thinking that they
 
would have the same effect-On basic writing students
 
(Daniell 401). Although Freire himself warned readers that
 
some would reject his work, with its emphasis on love and
 
hope, as overly idealistic (Oppressed, 21), teachers in the
 
Northern hemisphere ignored his idealism and adopted his
 
method as though it were ideologically neutral. When we
 
didn't get the same results, we wondered why. Bizzell's
 
conclusion is that no,method can itself create critical
 
consciousness (Daniell 401). Social equality is not an
 
inevitable result of critical thinking. Teachers who value
 
democracy must recognize that promoting that value in
 
students involves asserting influence. The changes that
 
Freire inspired in his students, then, were not solely the
 
result of teaching them critical thinking.
 
Beth Daniell writes that North Americans have
 
overlooked the charismatic relationship Freire had with his
 
students and the passion he brought to his educational
 
philosophy. Freire treated his students with respect, asked
 
them about their lives, and listened to what they had to
 
say, just like Socrates, and they responded by making great
 
 progress. Daniell writes, "Being treated . . . as if one
 
is - ]^es a fellow child of God, allows some people, even
 
the most silenced, to 'come to voice,' to use bell hooks'
 
term, and in so doing, to see the world and themselves
 
differently" (402). Daniell argues for reinstating the
 
missing element of spirituality in composition classrooms.
 
: Critical thinking and Platonic ideals are interwoven
 
in Sufi teaching, and they are not as clearly separable in
 
composition as some of us hope. Both ask students to
 
reject some of their assumptions and cultural conditioning,
 
and both question the adequacy of language. The separation
 
between them becomes even more problematic when we realize
 
that justice and harmony do not arise automatically from
 
critical reading. Teachers who promote any values -- racial
 
or sexual equality, love, beauty, peace -- must face the
 
realization that'they have left the camp of postmodern
 
relativism. r­
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CHAPTER SIX: The Fruit Vendor
 
Learning objectives in composition classes have become
 
more abstract in the postmodern era. In most composition
 
classrooms, the teaching of rhetorical strategies, such as
 
the modes of discourse and the five-paragraph theme, has
 
been supplemented, or even replaced, by the teaching of
 
psychological strategies for managing cognition, strategies
 
such as planning and revision (Bereiter and Scardamalia
 
249). How do we teach students to perform these processes
 
and even more complex and social ones such as questidning
 
assumptions and reading critically? Here, again, the
 
experience of the Sufi masters is congruent with the latest
 
ideas in composition theory.
 
Sufi teachers employ a variety of strategies for
 
enticing students to expand their capacity for processing
 
knowledge. They do not work through traditional, frontal
 
methods of instruction such as supplying students with
 
information and telling them the rules for processing it,
 
but by setting up experiences that invite students to learn
 
through their own investigations. Sufi pedagogy is well
 
illustrated by a story told about a fourteenth century
 
teacher in the Middle East, founder of one of the major
 
Sufi orders:
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 Someone said to Bahaudin Naqshband:
 
"You relate stories, but you do not tell us
 
how to understand them."
 
' He said: "How would you like it if the man
 
from who you bought fruit consumed it before your
 
very eyes, leaving you only the skin?" (Shah,
 
Thinkers 137)
 
Reading between the lines of this very short story, we
 
see a student whose expectations are based on a traditional
 
received-knowledge pedagogy and a teacher who sees the
 
process of making meaning as the juicy part of education.
 
We see a teacher who poses a problem in the form of an
 
analogy. The teacher sees that interpreting stories for the
 
student would not facilitate understanding but would rob
 
the student of a valuable experience.
 
Paulo Freire tells a very similar story about his
 
experience in teaching illiterate peasants in Brazil. A
 
student said to him, "Why don't you explain the pictures
 
first? That way it'll take less time and won't give us a
 
headache" (Oppressed 49-50). Freire, top, needed to
 
convince the student that he was able to think for himself.
 
Freire uses the incident to introduce the readers of
 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed to his concept of preliterate
 
knowledge. His belief that the student already "knows
 
something" allows for a concept of education that is
 
generative.
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depend on a vision of the activities of
 
experiencing,,.reading, and interpreting as active,
 
recursive processes. Many of the methods used by Sufi
 
teachers call to mind, strategies that are being used in
 
some compositioh teaching today.
 
Scatter
 
Variety itself is a feature of the Sufi pedagogy,
 
referred'to in'S literature as "scatter" (Shah, Sufis
 
18,}.. Unlike,the dervishes in the story of "What Befell the,
 
Three," who each remain faithful to a single teaching
 
method, Sufi teachers employ,an arsenal of weapons to
 
destroy the commitment oftthe student to a vision of the'„ ,
 
world as fragmented. At Sufi gatherings, students
 
participate in multi-part choral singing, drumming, and
 
dance. The stories are often told or enacted or sung to '
 
ecstatic melody, interspersed with instrumental music, or
 
as openings to lectures and class discussions, to promote
 
interaction between the teacher and groups of learners. The
 
teacher uses the stories to pose problems or to act as a
 
mirror, mimicking the dysfunctional behaviors of the
 
student,(Shah, Learning 289). In this sense, the stories :
 
are immediate and oral., But the Sufi teacher doesn't expect
 
the student to cross the bridge of implicature instantly or
 
even by the next class meeting. The stories are expected to
 
work gradually and cumulatively to break down the students'
 
resistance (Learning, 38), an expectation that seems to me
 
more consistent with the recursive nature of reading and
 
writing than with the immediacy of oral communication.
 
This concept of teaching is currently popular in
 
elementary education, where we call it "multiple
 
intelligences." It does not seem to be discussed so overtly
 
in the literature of composition, but many of us teach in
 
ways that are informed by this idea, asking our students to
 
"read" codes from popular culture, movies and songs as well
 
as from the traditional genres of academic writing. We also
 
display the value we place on variety by moving from
 
lecture to small group to one-on-one conferences and
 
written response to student writing.
 
The Reading Process
 
Sufi stories, although sometimes orally transmitted,
 
have also been written down and read as instructional texts
 
that are expected to be read differently by different
 
readers or differently by the same reader at different
 
times. Unlike the composition/literature teacher who seeks
 
to support a text with historical context in order to give
 
it a more determinate reading (Berlin, Rhetorics 130), a
 
■;-80 „ " ' ■
 
Sufi teacher's goal is to foil the concept of ah educated
 
reading.
 
Sufis have done unique work in adapting the written
 
word to the purpose of generating multiple responses. Shah
 
compares these written texts to dehydrated onions {Learning
 
67). They are not exactly the same thing as fresh onions (a
 
symbol for live teacher-student interaction), but if the
 
necessary ingredient - (water or understanding) is applied,
 
the resulting product will be of some immediate use and
 
will also teach the reader to recognize fresh onions on
 
some other occasion.
 
The, Sufi idea that the understanding process occurs
 
as a sequence of drafts is something like the reading
 
theory advanced by Peter Elbow. Elbow writes:
 
Students could come to see reading as an obvious
 
process of cognitive and social construction if there
 
were only a tradition in literature as there is in
 
writing of . . .sharing what we might call 'rough
 
drafts of reading': showing or talking about their
 
actual reading process from the beginning. (English
 
\-,l3l-32')
 
T suggest that the Sufi way of using teaching stories,
 
sharing differing interpretations, is very much the kind of
 
tradition that Elbow wishes for.
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Difficulty
 
Shah says that the stories "often enable people to
 
absorb ideas which the ordinary patterns of their thinking
 
would prevent them from digesting" {Sufis 1). He adds, in
 
Learning How to Learn, that students may be turned "away
 
from automatism by using techniques devised to outmanoeuvre
 
it" (127). What are those techniques?
 
One of the ways that Sufi teachers subvert the
 
habitual thought patterns of their students is by refusing
 
to give answers to the questions the stories raise. This
 
idea that students should do the work of discovering the
 
alternatives for invention or revision is expressed in
 
contemporary theory in non-directive, problem-posing
 
responses to student writing. Taken to an extreme, the idea
 
manifests itself as the "generative power of difficulty"
 
pedagogy developed by Anthony Petrosky.
 
The Sufi version of difficulty lies in the teacher's
 
refusal to explain obscure texts. My first experience with
 
Sufi teaching is a clear illustration. About 1983, I read
 
one of Idries Shah's books and, intrigued, wrote to his
 
North American headquarters, the Institute for the Study of
 
Human Knowledge, for further instruction. I received a
 
letter saying that, when I had read and understood all of
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 shah's books,, the teachers might, speak with me.. Enclosed :
 
was an order blank for 21 books. I was angry and suspicious
 
about the motivation, of these :teachers,, but I-bought the
 
books, a collection of more than 2000 Sufi teaching stories
 
strung together with some cryptic commentary. I began to
 
study them. Five years later I was still studying them, and
 
it appeared to me that I had still not begun to understand.
 
I was discouraged by the large number of stories that told
 
about teachers turning away students who were incapable of
 
learning. A similar story is told by psychologist Jay
 
Einhorn (5)/ who concludes that the stories "provide som.e
 
information useful right away and additional dimensions of
 
potential value which become activated as and when the
 
student is ready." Einhorn postulates that the work the
 
student does to understand the stories helps to build
 
connections between the left and right hemispheres of the
 
brain, a step toward the evolution of a new organ of
 
perception (3).
 
At the time I was reading Sufi stories, I could not
 
identify any positive effects from the work I was doing.
 
However, when I finally met live Sufi teachers, I found
 
that "soaking" in the stories had prepared me to accept
 
teachings that I would have rejected a few years earlier.
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The stories had weakened my grip on the world-view I had
 
previously thought of as reality and had increased my
 
tolerance for "impossible" evidence. My period of isolated
 
study also seemed to have increased my capacity to
 
concentrate my attention. My experience with the Sufi
 
version of difficulty pedagogy was that its benefits were
 
not immediately visible.
 
Anthony Petrosky (262) bffers an example of the use of
 
difficulty pedagogy in composition when he describes
 
student writing about a chapter of Michel Foucault's
 
Discipline and Punish as they begin a freshman writing
 
course centered around the theme of the relationships among
 
body, power, and knowledge. The dense and unfamiliar text
 
challenges some students to make the mentaT leaps necessary
 
to understand it, to see Foucault's discussion of the
 
changes in punishment in his terms, rather than in the
 
preconceived terms of a modernist narrative of linear
 
progress (263). The difficult writing assignment may make
 
rhetorical moves, such as openings and conclusions, more
 
visible. Petrosky writes that students' understanding of
 
Foucault is shaped by their rereading and their writing of
 
multiple drafts as they gradually move into the
 
intellectual realm of his complex text (279).
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 ^ Some stucjents never it, however,
 
presentirig a pedagogical problem that Petrosky doesri't, seem
 
to solve. Rise Axelrod's commentary on this pedagogy is
 
. that,some students (CSUSB,.students: fox .example) may need
 
additional "scaffoldihg"barly in :the?invention process
 
because they do not have the schema in place to understand
 
or to write about difficult texts. She questions whether
 
sufficient motivation may be a problem for State University
 
freshmen dealing with obscure texts.
 
Sufi teachers, facing the problem of students who
 
don't understand, write some students off as unteachable,
 
commenting that they are unwilling to abandon their
 
addiction to their existing beliefs, or that they have
 
insufficient time and capacity (Shah, Learning 110).
 
Motivation is not a quality highly regarded by Sufis, who
 
see it as a form of sanctified greed that usually prompts a
 
student to excel in ways that cause injustice to others.
 
But the Sufi teacher has other techniques to use in
 
breaking down the resistance of students. One technique, '
 
illustrated by the story of the teacher as a fruit vendor,
 
is that of teaching by analogy, by substituting a simple
 
and concrete example for a complex abstract idea.
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 Goal Concretization
 
"Goal concretization" is the term used by educational
 
psychologists Carl Bereiter and Marlene Scardamalia for
 
procedures that reduce the processing burden necessary for
 
bringing a self-regulatory strategy into use by
 
substituting a simplified version of the project for the
 
difficult and abstract goals that students are ultimately
 
to master. A goal concretization teaching strategy might
 
introduce a metaphor or an analogy, creating a substitute
 
problem that is psychologically equivalent (287). The Sufi
 
story in Chapter Two about the teacher in the well might be
 
used in this way. After the students laughed at the plight
 
of the teacher, they might transfer their understanding of
 
it to the Sufi problem of deciding when it is appropriate
 
to help a neighbor. Or they might transfer their
 
understanding of it to the composition problem of deciding
 
under what circumstances Standard English or grammatical
 
correctness is required.
 
The strategies required for situating one's argument
 
in an ongoing academic conversation might be another
 
example of the kind of self-regulatory function that
 
Bereiter and Scardamalia address. One story that could be
 
used for the purpose of helping students see their
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positions as situatep"is ;,"Th in the . Datk." 
Looking at this silly fictional situation, where people are 
groping around in the dark trying to agree on a definition 
of elephants, students quickly see that their efforts to 
find a single true objective definition of their topics are 
equally vain. h- ■: h', 
The ideas of goal concretization and difficulty may 
seem to be contradictory if we think of them in terms of 
the amount of processing required for the student to solve 
a problem. But the Sufi view of thinking doesn't approach 
the strategies from that direction. The experience of 
mental processing, not the solving of a problem, is the 
goal. Both of these techniques involve mental exercise, and 
thus both are considered by Sufis to be helpful parts of 
"the work that breaks us open and devastates the habitual 
self" (Barks 72) . 
The concept that a text can do this kind of work is an 
inherent part of a social-epistemic view of rhetoric. As we 
have adopted postmodern views of reading and writing as 
interrelated meaning-making activities, our view of text 
has changed from a static, positivist image of an 
instrument of transmission, an object from which students 
should receive knowledge, to a dynamic image of text as an 
ever-changing energy that does something different with
 
each reader. , We,have moved away from privileging texts for
 
what they are (poetics) to concerning ourselves with what
 
they do (rhetoric) (Berlin, tRhetorics xv|. This current
 
concept of text is well represented, I think, by techniques
 
that depend on a vision of language as catalytic.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: A Donkey in Victorville
 
I've looked for places in my teaching of composition
 
where a Sufi teaching story might help. Most of the time,
 
when I tell a Sufi story, I use it as an opening joke, and
 
then I ask the students what they think I am doing.
 
Generally my suggestion that I have a purpose is greeted
 
with some kind of resistance. "It's just a joke," a student
 
will say.
 
1 explain that the story seems like a joke, but it was
 
used for another purpose in the culture where it was
 
written. Everyone looks blank. I ask, "Well, why is it
 
funny? Why did you laugh?"
 
Then the interpretations of the story start coming.
 
A teacher who takes on the disorderly world of Sufi
 
teaching must be prepared for discussion that can go in
 
many directions. When a student gives a new interpretation,
 
I say, "Wow! I never thought of that I That's terrific! Hang
 
on a second while I write that down in my notes." In that
 
way, I model the spirit of open-minded inquiry that I want
 
my students to adopt as well. Students begin to see the
 
activity of unraveling a story as a kind of play.
 
Twice I have devoted a whole class hour to Sufi
 
stories, in Freshman Composition courses at Victor Valley
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Cdllege/ I point in the semester when
 
we had been working for several weeks on becoming aware of
 
slanted language, politicail language, seleGtive reading
 
arid texts that attempt to mririi^ulate i {S the;reading '
 
had been difficult. I suggested thatwe relax and have some
 
fun with some little stories that have been popular in the :
 
Middle East for many centuries.
 
First I told a little about Mulla Nasrudin. I said ■ 
that a Mulla in Islam is a village holy man, the person you
 
would go see to get married. Nasrudin probably never
 
existed, but he has been a popular folk hero for a long,
 
long time, going around saying wise things or bumbling
 
idiot things that helped people see what was going on. The
 
Turkish government has recently provided him with a
 
biography and a tomb so that tourists can go visit it, and
 
they have put his picture on their postage stamps. He's a
 
plump little cartoon character like Charlie Brown. I really
 
don't know why that government is honoring him, because
 
Mulla has never thought much of government, I said.
 
Actually, Mulla hasn't thought very highly of English
 
teachers, either, I confided, and I told a version of the
 
story of the teacher in the well (see Chapter Two), where
 
the holy man's name is Nasrudin (Shah, Exploits 18).
 
The class laughed. "I don't know why I'm telling you
 
this story," I said. "What's the point?"
 
"The point is that practical matters are more
 
important than grammar," one student said, helpfully.
 
"Oh. Yes," I said. "But that's not MY point, because
 
I'm your English teacher." The students laughed some more,
 
and I passed out handouts with three more Sufi teaching
 
stories.
 
The first one was "The Elephant in the Dark," which
 
appears in Chapters Four and Five. I used the poetic Rumi
 
version, but I left out the part about the Light of Moses,
 
because I was trying to keep this discussion on a secular
 
level.
 
I asked a student to read it aloud. Then I asked what
 
was going on here. Slowly, hesitantly, students said that
 
the elephant was in a dark room and nobody knew what an
 
elephant was, so the various observers reported different
 
things. I made encouraging noises as this recapping was
 
going on. "What's the solution?" I asked. "Could these
 
different people ever agree?"
 
From this point, the discussion moved in different
 
directions in one class than it did in the other, but both
 
groups eventually covered the same points.
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\ class, somebody said, "Well, they could
 
talk it over. If they all compiled their various
 
observations, they would know a lot more about elephants
 
"Great idea!" I said,
 
"But would they agree?" somebody asked.
 
, "They don't have to agree. They just put all their
 
different parts together," somebody said.
 
"Oh. Like a collaboration," I said hesitantly, as if I
 
were just beginning to get the point.
 
"Yes," several students said.
 
"What if somebody turned on the light?" somebody said.
 
"Aha!" I said. "Would everybody then be able to see 
the same thing? ^ ■ 
"No," the students said. "Some would see the back of
 
the elephant, and some would see the front. Everybody still
 
has a point of view."
 
"So what can they do?" I asked.
 
"They still need to talk it over."
 
"Is it possible to have a truly objective point of
 
view? Can you ever see the whole elephant?" I asked. Nobody
 
seemed to think it is.
 
In my 11:00 class, the first answer was that somebody
 
should turn on the light. But from there the conversation
 
ran the same course, with the conclusion being that
 
observation is inevitably situated. One student suggested
 
that by walking around the elephant one could get multiple
 
perspectives. But other students pointed out that the
 
perspectives of those who traveled would still depend on
 
whether they saw the elephant as meat, or as an art object,
 
or as a relative. It seemed to me that we had found a very
 
easy way to talk about how knowledge is positioned.
 
Then I asked a student to read the second story aloud,
 
"Don't Lie to Your Mother." It's a story I heard while
 
traveling in central Anatolia. This is the story:
 
Mulla Nasrudin knotted a rope and put it
 
around his donkey's neck, and he led the donkey
 
through the woods to the marketplace where he
 
planned to sell it. He fed it carrots along the
 
way so it would be nice and fat when it got to
 
the market.
 
Two boys were following Mulla through the
 
woods, plotting to steal his donkey. They sneaked
 
up behind him and slipped the rope off of the
 
donkey's neck. One of them ran away with the.
 
donkey while the other one put the rope around
 
his own neck so Mulla wouldn't notice anything.
 
Mulla turned around to give his donkey
 
another carrot and saw that he was leading a boy
 
instead.
 
"What are you doing here?" he asked.
 
The boy replied, "I lied to my mother last
 
year, so she cast a spell on me and turned me
 
into a donkey. She said I would remain a donkey
 
until someone did a kind deed for me. And you,
 
kind master, have fed me carrots and released me
 
from my enchantment. Thank you, thank you, kind
 
master."
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 Mulla said,. "Oh, it was nothing, really. You
 
run along home now, and don't lie to your mother
 
, any more ' ^
 
"Thank you, thank you, kind master," the boy
 
said as he ran to meet his friend.
 
, Mulla continued on toward the market.. When, ,
 
he got there, he.was Surprised to see his donkey
 
, - being offered for sale by two boys. He walked up ,
 
to them, looked the donkey sternly in the eye,
 
and said, "I told you not to lie to your mother."
 
Everyone laughed. I asked them why they were laughing.
 
What is funny about this story? In both classes, someone :
 
responded that it was funny because the reader knows more
 
than Mulla does. This is the response I expected. , , ,
 
Then, in both classes, something happened that I
 
wasn't expecting: the alternate reading came up right away. ­
Some students felt that Mulla knew just as much as the
 
reader and was just pretending to be scammed. "It's a
 
parody of innocence," one student said. Another student
 
said "Huh?" The first student explained the tradition of
 
wise jesters in literature. We built a complicated chart on
 
the blackboard: what Mulla was admitting he knew, what the
 
writer knows, what the reader knows, and what makes us
 
think we know what they know. The column of ideas about
 
what the reader knows grew to include these items: the boys
 
are plotting; one admits he is a liar; he,uses flattery; he
 
has an economic interest.^ j . ' 1,
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 . "It's just like: poiiticians, isn't It?" one student
 
'said. ■ ■ ■ 
"What do you think? Is it?" I asked. Nobody had much
 
good to say about politicians, or much of an answer about
 
how we can expose theit/ either,
 
I asked, "Why is it that Mulla recognized the donkey,
 
rather than the boy?"
 
.. . Students replied, "Tunnel vision,I and "Denial " We
 
talked about the effect of one's belief system on what one
 
is,able tO: see. We balked about the: difficulty of knowing
 
what to believe. Students who usually were silent seemed to
 
feel cbmfortable talking about how they know things.
 
We went on to the third story: "Whose Truth?" which
 
appears in Chapter Four of this paper, the story about the
 
king who was going to hang anybody who didn't tell the
 
truth.
 
Once again, everyone laughed. "Why is it funny?" I
 
asked. ■ . l ■' ■ '1
 
"I don't know. I'm still trying to figure it out,"
 
somebody said. Several students were drawing diagrams.
 
"Is there somethinglwrong with this logic?" I asked. 
"Has anybody taken a critical thinking class or a 
philosophy class? Can you help us out?" 
Somebody observed that logic doesn't apply to
 
everything. "Maybe truth is something positioned too," she
 
said.
 
"Can there be an absolute truth?" another student
 
asked. I was getting really excited; never in my wildest
 
dreams has a student asked this question in my class.
 
"I don't know. Can there?" I asked, and I wrote the
 
question on the blackboard. The students tossed it around
 
for awhile, and I wrote another one: "How would I know?"
 
"Now ypu begin to see where we're going," I said,
 
"because you are about to begin working on research papers.
 
You'll be dealing with questions about how you know what
 
you claim, whether it is true, what evidence you have. How
 
would you know whether something was true?"
 
In this discussion, every student in both classes got
 
involved, including students who have never opened their
 
mouths before. We listed and discussed the ways the
 
students thought of that a person could know something:
 
authority, noting plural voices, evidence such as
 
documents, experiment, repetition, reasoning, behavioral
 
cues, testing a hypothesis, intuition, and faith. There was
 
a lot:of talk about "just knowing," the way that mothers
 
know what their children have been doing. Some students
 
96
 
said they never operate on iaith.; I said that I do; evfery; ■ 
time I flush'the tor faith,that .the:water : ; 
wil1 go down the drain. This comment prompted somebody to , 
observe that in the Southern hemisphere water goes down the 
drain the wrong way. 
"The WRONG way?" I asked.
 
Everyone leaped to inform me that water drains
 
counter-clockwise south of the equator. "What's wrong with
 
that?" I asked. "Who says that clockwise is better?" I drew
 
a picture of a globe on the board and asked whether it was
 
right side up. We agreed that it is people in the northern
 
hemisphere who have put themselves at the top of the map
 
and decided which way water should drain.
 
Thus we came to the possibility that there might be
 
not only multiple voices, but voices that have more or less
 
political power. Someone asked how to deal with multiple
 
voices in a research paper. Some students said that you
 
should look at the different points of view and try to
 
reconcile them, try to find the truth. "Whose truth?" I
 
asked. "What if you are writing about euthanasia or
 
abortion? Is there ever going to be just one answer?"
 
"What do I do, then?" a student asked.
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I suggested that it is possible in a research paper to
 
record the conversation and place oneself within it,
 
without choosing one as right and one as wrong.
 
I envisioned this discussion as a part of a long-term
 
project in thinking, an event that might be recalled f^om
 
time to time as we worked on a variety of writing projects.
 
It has Seemed to work that way. The elephant, in
 
particular, became a presence in our classroom; when
 
students didn't agree, they sometimes said something like,
 
"Oh, you're looking at this from another side of the
 
elephant."
 
I think that I used these texts in much the same way
 
that teachers use political texts and ask students to
 
analyze what they mean, but with the important difference
 
that these teaching stories come from far distant culture,
 
so there was no contact zone involved. None of my students
 
had a vested interest in any particular reading of these
 
texts. Their historical context was of interest only in
 
that it was "other."
 
I did not expect an immediate assessable outcome, but
 
I did want to add a writing assignment to this lesson. One
 
possibility might have been to use the stories as models of
 
analogy and to ask the students to create analogies of
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their own. But it was not the form of the stories that
 
interested me; it was the thought processes they inspired.
 
So, the last ten minutes of class, I asked the students to
 
freewrite on the subject of what they know. "Name something
 
you know for sure, and tell how you know it," I said. In
 
creating this prompt, I was enacting another Sufi move,
 
that of asking students to do something would not be
 
possible if they had truly learned the lesson (Ghazzali
 
70). I read their writing looking for evidence that the
 
idea of knowing had been problematized.
 
About one fourth of the students showed no such
 
concept. They wrote in common-sense positivist ways about
 
knowing things because they had seen them or because they
 
had learned about them in school. Several of these students
 
defended cultural conditioning, as something they feel
 
obligated to pass on to their children. I thought this move
 
was particularly interesting because we.had not directly
 
mentioned conditioning in class, but it appeared that some
 
students felt that it was under attack. About a third of
 
the students expressed some kind of doubt, saying they know
 
some things, but sometimes they are wrong. The remaining
 
students, the largest category, wrote about knowing things
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in more than one way, sometimes knowing by authority and
 
sometimes knowing by intuition.
 
When I looked again at these papers to see what
 
knowable things my students named, a single subject
 
stretched across all the ways of knowing: more than half
 
the students wrote about knowing God. They knew God because
 
they had read scriptures, but they also witnessed in their
 
hearts, or they knew about God because they had been
 
conditioned or brainwashed, but they had also come to their
 
own understanding of God. They knew God because they had
 
seen beauty, or because they had felt His love in
 
meditation.
 
I was disturbed by this outpouring of religious fervor
 
because I had made such a great effort to secularize the
 
teaching stories. I had not told the students the way they
 
were originally used: to show that all human ways of
 
knowing are flawed, but that a great reality transcends
 
human knowledge. But, I thought, the stories worked the
 
same way in Victorville as they did in medieval Persia,
 
prompting students to question science and logic and
 
authority and to leap to a religious conclusion.
 
I told this story to a colleague who was teaching
 
Freshman Composition at San Bernardino Valley College. She
 
100
 
discussed ways of knowing with her students without using
 
any Sufi stories, and she assigned the same writing prompt.
 
Her students responded in almost exactly the same way. They
 
discussed a variety of ways of knowing, but more than half
 
of them wrote about knowing God.
 
Obviously this little comparative study is not
 
conclusive, but it did relieve me of my fear that I had
 
forced my students to turn to religion. It suggests,
 
rather, that some kind of spirituality is important to many
 
students, and that when we open the possibility of working
 
outside the logical-argument box of normal academic
 
discourse we are likely to read about God.
 
But to return to the question of assessing whether
 
Sufi stories work to augment the ways teachers and students
 
talk about constructing knowledge, I really do not know how
 
to tell. When we use a variety of teaching methods, it is
 
always difficult to sort out which ones had an impact on
 
the students. Further research in this area might use
 
questionnaires or surveys to ask students whether the Sufi
 
stories contributed to their understanding.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: Living Outdoors with our Friends
 
Jelaluddin Rumi wrote this cautionary couplet in the
 
thirteenth century:
 
When you come across a storyteller
 
Know a house is being destroyed. (Harvey 55)
 
The house Rumi is referring to here is the false self, 
the comfortable self that identifies with body and 
biography, the self that has bought into the conventions of 
society. Composition theorists Lester Faigley and James 
Berlin have addressed the current debate in composition 
about asking students to occupy this house, identifying the 
image of coherent and stable writer with the house of 
illusions built by En1ightenment humanism. Expressivist ■ 
teachers have also asked students to tear down and remove 
organizing structures in order to make room for creativity. 
This destruction is the only part of the Sufi work I
 
was prepared to consider when I began this study. I was
 
thinking of Rumi's many images of breaking the forms that
 
confine our thought. I was thinking of the Rumi who wrote,
 
"The whole place goes up, all stability gone to smoke"
 
(Open 36). These demolition stories seemed to me to do
 
important work for our time by freeing students from
 
pretending to be,objective and by calling attention to
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hegemonic practices that have limited their success. I was
 
impressed by the way Sufi teachers are able to expose the
 
multiple selves we see with.
 
But when I put'on my curriculum-planning hat, I was
 
constrained by a tradition that separates school from
 
religion. I was constrained by my fear that Habermas might
 
be right in; M claim that every foundational metanarrative
 
does damage to someone. I struggled a long time with the
 
ihcompatibility of my positions.
 
In this situation, I also looked closely at my
 
students:, and I noticed that they rely on a variety of
 
modes of knowing. Intuition and revelation are part of many
 
of tiheir personal epistemologies, standing beside belief in
 
authorities, personal sensory experience, and use of
 
inductive or deductive reasoning. I found that class
 
discussions and writing assignments that ask students to
 
identify how they know what they know often reveal
 
extrasensory or metaphysical experiences. Consequently I do
 
not feel comfortable about excluding these experiences from
 
consideration in my writing classes. I have decided that
 
,any exercise that invites students to interrogate their
 
assumptions is a useful one.
 
103
 
  
: James Moffett explores a similar^question his i,982 ; ,
 
College English article JWritihg, Inner - Speech,- and v
 
Meditation," Considering whe^^ meditation..practices that
 
have a transcehdent aim are o.ut of place in : the.Gompositio.n .
 
classroom. (24.6)i. I am .com .the conclusion he
 
reaches in his rebuttal' to . criti comments.: .."Human beings.,
 
rely on several authorities for their "knowledge. ,The dnly- :
 
problem comes,from.excluding some. If it is a mode of
 
knowing:, it beldngs;" ,("Comment -iOd:), . This line bf ^argument:
 
is one:that Paulo Freire follows:-when:;hei comments that;he..
 
is concerned about classrooms that do not allow students to
 
exercise epistemological curiosity and to engage in dialog
 
about the possibility of ontological responsibility. (Heart
 
100).
 
; I have another reason for liking to use stories that
 
rely on an assumption that we are, at some deep level, all
 
alike. I think that the postmodern foregrounding of the^
 
differences between us does us a disservice to our common
 
humanity. I honor and support the different world-views,
 
ideological commitments and faiths my students bring to the
 
classroom, but I also ask students to keep an eye open for
 
the possibility of cross-cultural absolutes. Is there
 
something we all need, no matter what our background?
 
 Respect, love, opportunity? Are there things that we all
 
do? Make metaphors and create new patterns of language?
 
I believe that the Sufi stories illuminate a path
 
through the illusions of positivism, fostering a kind of
 
literacy. But that path does not stop at literacy: it leads
 
all the way to a new^ ^ ^^u of our common ground as
 
human beings.
 
So, as I have worked with the stories and worked with
 
.students> I'.ve started : taking some Msks. Jive taught ; 
Rumi's elephant story. I'ye. said to niy class, "What Rum^ 
means by the Light of Mohea is love, a term probably"top 
strong for most of us to apply to the making of knowledge ■ 
, . :.but what if we called it respect?" Heads nodded. 
Respect makes sense to studehts. 
What if we agree to respect all the voices that 
emerge in our classroom? What if we imagine the feelings 
that ■ caused some ancient person to draw a picture of a hand 
on the wall of the cave: a need for expression, and awe at
 
the capabilities of the human being. What if we bring that
 
awe to the classroom when we look at each other's writing?
 
I think that many of us in composition, even those
 
most committed to postmodern views, long to reclaim some
 
such meaning for our discipline. Lester Faigley, for
 
example; looks for ways to find an ethical position, eveh :
 
if it is only a local one (239). James Berlin, even while
 
denouncing foundationalism, affirms his belief that social
 
jhstice shohld^^ b goal of cbmpdsition classes (53). Ann
 
Berthoff asks that we not attempt to banish foundations,
 
but to develop a critical consciousness with which to
 
examine them, using spirit as a "speculative instrument."
 
(238),. Pahlp F about the religious convictions
 
that fuel his fight for social justice, saying "I have
 
always prayed, asking that God give me increased
 
disposition ;to fight against the abuses of the powerful
 
against the oppressed" (Heart 65). These are not far-out
 
airy-fairy voices; these are the voices of people who have
 
relentlessly asked the hard questions that have expanded
 
the landscape of composition.
 
Sufi storytellers are talking about God all the time,
 
when they appear to be talking about donkeys or keys or the
 
fragrance of the garden. We rarely hear a Sufi speak of God
 
in anthropomorphic terms. But once, long ago, I heard a
 
Sufi say that God created the world because He loves a good
 
story (Qalbi). I teach writing for the same reason.
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